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How to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit?

As explained in our two previous articles relating to Brexit, ‟How to protect your creative business after Brexit?” and ‟Brexit legal implications: the road less travelled”, the European Union (‟EU”) regulations and conventions on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, ceased to apply in the United Kingdom (‟UK”) once it no longer was a EU member-state. Therefore, since 1 January 2021 (the ‟Transition date”), no clear legal system is in place, to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit, in a EU member-state, or in the UK. Creative businesses now have to rely on domestic recognition regimes in the UK and each EU member-state, if in existence. This introduces additional procedural steps before a foreign judgment is recognised, which makes the enforcement of EU civil and commercial judgments in the UK, and of UK civil and commercial judgments in the EU, more time-consuming, complex and expensive.

How to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit1. How things worked before Brexit, with respect to the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between the EU and the UK

a. The EU legal framework

Before the Transition date on which the UK ceased to be a EU member-state, there were, and there still are between the 27 remaining EU member-states, four main regimes that are applicable to civil and commercial judgments obtained from EU member-states, depending on when, and where, the relevant proceedings were started.

Each regime applies to civil and commercial matters, and therefore excludes matters relating to revenue, customs and administrative law. There are also separate EU regimes applicable to matrimonial relationships, wills, successions, bankruptcy and social security.

The most recent enforcement regime applicable to civil and commercial judgments is EU regulation n. 1215/2012 of the European parliament and of the council dated 12 December 2012 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Recast Brussels regulation). It applies to EU member-states’ judgments handed down in proceedings started on or after 10 January 2015.

The original Council regulation n. 44/2001 dated 22 December 2000 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Original Brussels regulation”), although no longer in force upon the implementation of the Recast Brussels regulation on 9 January 2015, still applies to EU member-states’ judgments handed down in proceedings started before 10 January 2015.

Moreover, the Brussels convention dated 27 September 1968 on the jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Brussels convention”), also continues to apply in relation to civil and commercial judgments between the 15 pre-2004 EU member-states and certain territories of EU member-states which are located outside the EU, such as Aruba, Caribbean Netherlands, Curacao, the French overseas territories and Mayotte. Before the Transition date, the Brussels convention also applied to judgments handed down in Gibraltar, a British overseas territory.

Finally, the Lugano convention dated 16 September 1988 on the jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Lugano convention”), which was replaced on 21 December 2007 by the Lugano convention dated 30 October 2007 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟2007 Lugano convention”), govern the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between the EU and certain member-states of the European Free Trade Association (‟EFTA”), namely Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark but not Liechtenstein, which never signed the Lugano convention.

The 2007 Lugano convention was intended to replace both the Lugano convention and the Brussels convention. As such it was open to signature to both EFTA members-states and to EU member-states on behalf of their extra-EU territories. While the former purpose was achieved in 2010 with the ratification of the 2007 Lugano convention by all EFTA member-states (except Liechtenstein, as explained above), no EU member-state has yet acceded to the 2007 Lugano convention on behalf of its extra-EU territories.

The UK has applied to join the 2007 Lugano convention after the Transition date, as we will explain in more details in section 2 below.

b. Enforceability of remedies ordered by a EU court

Before Brexit, the Recast Brussels regulation, the Original Brussels regulation, the Brussels convention, the Lugano convention and the 2007 Lugano convention (together, the ‟EU instruments”) provided, and still provide with respect to the 27 remaining EU member-states, for the enforcement of any judgment in a civil or commercial matter given by a court of tribunal of a EU member-state, whatever it is called by the original court. For example, article 2(a) of the Recast Brussels regulation provides for the enforcement of any ‟decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as a decision on the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court”.

The Original Brussels regulation also extends to interim, provisional or protective relief (including injunctions), when ordered by a court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this regulation.

c. Competent courts

Before the Transition date, proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement of EU foreign judgments in the UK should be brought before the high court in England and Wales, the court of session in Scotland and the high court of Northern Ireland.

Article 32 of the Brussels convention provides that the proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement of EU foreign judgments in France should be brought before the president of the ‟tribunal judiciaire”. Therefore, before the Transition date, a UK judgment had to be brought before such president, in order to be recognised and enforced in France.

d. Separation of recognition and enforcement

Before the Transition date, and for judgments that fell within the EU instruments other than the Recast Brussels regulation, the process for obtaining recognition of a EU judgment was set out in detail in Part 74 of the UK civil procedure rules (‟CPR”). The process involved applying to a high court master with the support of written evidence. The application should include, among other things, a verified or certified copy of the EU judgment and a certified translation (if necessary). The judgment debtor then had an opportunity to oppose appeal registration on certain limited grounds. Assuming the judgment debtor did not successfully oppose appeal registration, the judgment creditor could then take steps to enforce the judgment.

Before the Transition date, and for judgments that fell within the Recast Brussels regulation, the position was different. Under article 36 of the Recast Brussels regulation, judgments from EU member-states are automatically recognised as if they were a judgment of a court in the state in which the judgment is being enforced; no special procedure is required for the judgment to be recognised. Therefore, prior to Brexit, all EU judgments that fell within the Recast Brussels regulation were automatically recognised as if they were UK judgments, by the high court in England and Wales, the court of session in Scotland and the high court of Northern Ireland. Similarly, all UK judgments that fell within the Recast Brussels regulation were automatically recognised as if they were French judgments, by the presidents of the French ‟tribunal judiciaires”.

Under the EU instruments, any judgment handed down by a court or tribunal from a EU member-state can be recognised. There is no requirement that the judgment must be final and conclusive, and both monetary and non-monetary judgments are eligible to be recognised. Therefore, neither the UK courts, nor the French courts, are entitled to investigate the jurisdiction of the originating EU court. Such foreign judgments shall be recognised without any special procedures, subject to the grounds for non-recognition set out in article 45 of the Recast Brussels regulation, article 34 of the Original Brussels regulation and article 34 of the Lugano convention, as discussed in paragraph e. (Defences) below.

For the EU judgment to be enforced in the UK, prior to the Transition date, and pursuant to article 42 of the Recast Brussels regulation and Part 74.4A of the CPR, the applicant had to provide the documents set out in above-mentioned article 42 to the UK court, i.e.

  • a copy of the judgment which satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity;
  • the certificate issued pursuant to article 53 of the Recast Brussels regulation, certifying that the above-mentioned judgment is enforceable and containing an extract of the judgment as well as, where appropriate, relevant information on the recoverable costs of the proceedings and the calculation of interest, and
  • if required by the court, a translation of the certificate and judgment.

It was incumbent on the party resisting enforcement to apply for refusal of recognition of the EU judgment, pursuant to article 45 of the Recast Brussels regulation.

Similarly, for UK judgments to be enforced in France, prior to the Transition date, the applicant had to provide the documents set out in above-mentioned article 42 to the French court, which would trigger the automatic enforcement of the UK judgment, in compliance with the principle of direct enforcement.

e. Defences

While a UK defendant may have raised merits-based defences to liability or to the scope of the award entered in the EU jurisdiction, the EU instruments contain express prohibitions on the review of the merits of a judgment from another EU member-state. Consequently, while a judgment debtor may have objected to the registration of a judgment under the EU instruments (or, in the case of the Recast Brussels regulation, which does not require such registration, appeal the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment), he or she could have done so only on strictly limited grounds.

In the case of the Recast Brussels regulation, there are set out in above-mentioned article 45 and include:

  • if recognition of the judgment would be manifestly contrary to public policy;
  • if the judgment debtor was not served with proceedings in time to enable the preparation of a proper defence, or
  • if conflicting judgments exist in the UK or other EU member-states.

Equivalent defences are set out in articles 34 to 35 of the Original Brussels regulation and the 2007 Lugano convention, respectively. The court may not have refused a declaration of enforceability on any other grounds.

Another ground for challenging the recognition and enforcement of EU judgments is the breach of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‟ECHR”), which is the right to a fair trial. However, since a fundamental objective underlying the EU regime is to facilitate the free movement of judgments by providing a simple and rapid procedure, and since it was established in Maronier v Larmer [2003] QB 620 that this objective would be frustrated if EU courts of an enforcing EU member-state could be required to carry out a detailed review of whether the procedures that resulted in the judgment had complied with article 6 of the ECHR, there is a strong presumption that the EU court procedures of other signatories of the ECHR are compliant with article 6. Nonetheless, the presumption can be rebutted, in which case it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the judgment.

To conclude, pre-Brexit, the EU regime (and, predominantly, the Recast Brussels regulation) was an integral part of the system of recognition and enforcement of judgments in the UK. However, after the Transition date, the UK left the EU regime as found in the Recast Brussels regulation, the Original Brussels regulation and the Brussels convention, since these instruments are only available to EU member-states.

So what happens now?

2. How things work after Brexit, with respect to the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between the EU and the UK

In an attempt to prepare the inevitable, the EU commission published on 27 August 2020 a revised notice setting out its views on how various conflicts of laws issues will be determined post-Brexit, including jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments (the ‟EU notice”), while the UK ministry of justice published on 30 September 2020 Cross-border civil and commercial legal cases: guidance for legal professionals from 1 January 2021” (the ‟MoJ guidance”).

a. The UK accessing the 2007 Lugano convention

As mentioned above, the UK applied to join the 2007 Lugano convention on 8 April 2020, as this is the UK’s preferred regime for governing questions of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments with the 27 remaining EU member-states, after the Transition date.

However, accessing the 2007 Lugano convention is a four-step process and the UK has not executed those four stages in full yet.

While step one was accomplished on 8 April 2020 when the UK applied to join, step two requires the EU (along with the other contracting parties, ie the EFTA member-states Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark) to approve the UK’s application to join, followed in step three by the UK depositing the instrument of accession. Step four is a three-month period, during which the EU (or any other contracting state) may object, in which case the 2007 Lugano convention will not enter into force between the UK and that party. Only after that three-month period has expired, does the 2007 Lugano convention enter into force in the UK.

Therefore, in order for the 2007 Lugano convention to have entered into force by the Transition date, the UK had to have received the EU’s approval and deposited its instrument of accession by 1 October 2020. Neither have occured.

Since the EU’s negotiating position, throughout Brexit, has always been ‟nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, and in light of the recent collision course between the EU and the UK relating to trade in Northern Ireland, it is unlikely that the UK’s request to join the 2007 Lugano convention will be approved by the EU any time soon.

b. The UK accessing the Hague convention

Without the 2007 Lugano convention, the default position after the Transition date is that jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments for new cases issued in the UK will be determined by the domestic law of each UK jurisdiction (i.e. the common law of England and Wales, the common law of Scotland and the common law of Northern Ireland), supplemented by the Hague convention dated 30 June 2005 on choice of court agreements (‟The Hague convention”).

I. At common law rules

The common law relating to recognition and enforcement of judgments applies where the jurisdiction from which the judgment relates does not have an applicable treaty in place with the UK, or in the absence of any applicable UK statute. Prominent examples include judgments of the courts of the United States, China, Russia and Brazil. And now of the EU and its 27 remaining EU member-states.

At common law, a foreign judgment is not directly enforceable in the UK, but instead will be treated as if it creates a contract debt between the parties. The foreign judgment must be final and conclusive, as well as for a specific monetary sum, and on the merits of the action. The creditor will then need to bring an action in the relevant UK jurisdiction for a simple debt, to obtain judicial recognition in accordance with Part 7 CPR, and an English judgment.

Once the judgment creditor has obtained an English judgment in respect of the foreign judgment, that English judgment will be enforceable in the same way as any other judgment of a court in England.

However, courts in the UK will not give judgment on such a debt, where the original court lacked jurisdiction according to the relevant UK conflict of law rules, if it was obtained by fraud, or is contrary to public policy or the requirements of natural justice.

With such blurry and vague contours to the UK common law rules, no wonder that many lawyers and legal academics, on both sides of the Channel, decry the ‟mess” and ‟legal void” left by Brexit, as far as the enforcement and recognition of civil and commercial judgments in the UK are concerned.

II. The Hague convention

As mentioned above, from the Transition date onwards, the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments for new cases issued in England and Wales will be determined by its common law, supplemented by the Hague convention.

The Hague convention gives effect to exclusive choice of court clauses, and provides for judgments given by courts that are designated by such clauses to be recognised and enforced in other contracting states. The contracting states include the EU, Singapore, Mexico and Montenegro. The USA, China and Ukraine have signed the Hague convention but not ratified or acceded to it, and it therefore does not currently apply in those countries.

Prior to the Transition date, the UK was a contracting party to the Hague convention because it continued to benefit from the EU’s status as a contracting party. The EU acceded on 1 October 2015. By re-depositing the instrument of accession on 28 September 2020, the UK acceded in its own right to the Hague convention on 1 January 2021, thereby ensuring that the Hague convention would continue to apply seamlessly from 1 January 2021.

As far as types of enforceable orders are concerned, under the Hague convention, the convention applies to final decisions on the merits, but not interim, provisional or protective relief (article 7). Under article 8(3) of the Hague convention, if a foreign judgment is enforceable in the country of origin, it may be enforced in England. However, article 8(3) of the Hague convention allows an English court to postpone or refuse recognition if the foreign judgment is subject to appeal in the country of origin.

However, there are two major contentious issues with regards to the material and temporal scope of the Hague convention, and the EU’s and UK’s positions differ on those issues. They are likely to provoke litigation in the near future.

The first area of contention relates to the material scope of the Hague convention: more specifically, what is an ‟exclusive choice of court agreement”?

Article 1 of the Hague convention provides that the convention only applies to exclusive choice of courts agreements, so the issue of whether a choice of court agreement is ‟exclusive” or not is critical as to whether such convention applies.

Exclusive choice of court agreements are defined in article 3(a) of the Hague convention as those that designate ‟for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting state or one or more specific courts of one Contracting state, to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts”.

Non-exclusive choice of court agreements are defined in article 22(1) of the The Hague convention as choice of court agreements which designate ‟a court or courts of one or more Contracting states”.

Although this is a fairly clear distinction for ‟simple” choice of court agreements, ‟asymmetric” or ‟unilateral” agreements are not so easily categorised. These types of jurisdiction agreements are a common feature of English law-governed finance documents, such as the Loan Market Association standard forms. They generally give one contracting party (the lender) the choice of a range of courts in which to sue, while limiting the other party (the borrower) to the courts of a single state (usually, the lender’s home state).

There are divergent views as to whether asymmetric choice of court agreements are exclusive or non-exclusive for the purposes of the Hague convention. While two English high court judges have expressed the view that choice of court agreements should be regarded as exclusive, within the scope of the Hague convention, the explanatory report accompanying the Hague convention, case law in EU member-states and academic commentary all suggest the opposite.

This issue will probably be resolved in court, if and when the time comes to decide whether asymmetric or unilateral agreements are deemed to be exclusive choice of court agreements, susceptible to fall within the remit of the Hague convention.

The second area of contention relates to the temporal scope of the Hague convention: more specifically, when did the Hague convention ‟enter into force” in the UK?

Pursuant to article 16 of the Hague convention, such convention only applies to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded ‟after its entry into force, for the State of the chosen court”.

There is a difference of opinion as to the application of the Hague convention to exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of UK courts entered into between 1 October 2015 and 1 January 2021, when the UK was a party to the Hague convention by virtue of its EU membership.

Indeed, while the EU notice states that the Hague convention will only apply between the EU and UK to exclusive choice of court agreements ‟concluded after the convention enters into force in the UK as a party in its own right to the convention” – i.e. from the Transition date; the MoJ guidance sets out that the Hague convention ‟will continue to apply to the UK (without interruption) from its original entry into force date of 1 October 2015”, which is when the EU became a signatory to the convention, at which time the convention also entered into force in the UK by virtue of the UK being a EU member-state.

 

To conclude, the new regime of enforcement and recognition of EU judgments in the UK, and vice versa, is uncertain and fraught with possible litigation with respect to the scope of application of the Hague convention, at best.

Therefore, and since these legal issues relating to how to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit are here to stay for the medium term, it is high time for the creative industries to ensure that any dispute arising out of their new contractual agreements are resolved through arbitration.

Indeed, as explained in our article ‟Alternative dispute resolution in the creative industries, arbitral awards are recognised and enforced by the Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 1958 (the ‟New York convention”). Such convention is unaffected by Brexit and London, the UK capital, is one of the most popular and trusted arbitral seats in the world.

Until the dust settles, with respect to the recognition and enforcement of EU judgments in the UK, and vice versa, it is wise to resolve any civil or commercial dispute by way of arbitration, to obtain swift, time-effective and cost-effective resolution of matters, while preserving the cross-border relationships, established with your trade partners, between the UK and the European continent.



 

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    Why getting an agent is critical, to make it in the creative industries

    In the creative industries, the talent is often represented by middle men, who reach out to end customers, and find avenues whereby, and marketplaces on which, the products and/or services and skillset of the talent they represent are marketed, sold, distributed, licensed, etc. So, in the art world, these middle men are art galleries and auction houses. In the book publishing sector, these middle men are called literary agents, while in the film industry, those representing the above-the-line talent (actors, directors, writers) are called acting agents and agencies. Even music composers have their own composer agents, with a handful of players in this niche, in France and the United Kingdom (‟UK”). So, why do you need an agent, as a creative? How do you find an agent? How will your relationship with the agent work?

    agent1. Why do you need an agent, as a creative?

    As a creative, as a talent, you have mostly honed your creative skills, be it your painting skills, your sculpting skills, your acting skills, your writing and literary skills, your fashion design skills, etc.

    This is a completely different skill set than the one needed to:

    • getting substantial work in your creative field, relying on smooth marketing tactics, social media and public relations skills;
    • networking with the major players in your creative field, be it the most bankable film directors, the most skilled film producers, the stalwart book publishers, the most wealthy art collectors, the largest fashion brands who will hire you as a model for their catwalk presentations, etc.
    • negotiating sales, licensing, distribution agreements;
    • negotiating service providers agreement to act in a film or write the musical composition and soundtrack to a film;
    • negotiating publishing agreements of a literary work with books publishers and online content providers;
    • managing, in a strategical and optimal manner, the career of the talent, and
    • doing some reputation management work, when and if the career and image of a talent is getting tarnished for some reason.

    Well, in a nutshell, you have the required job description of an agent, set out above!

    This is why you need an agent: because he or she will do all the things mentioned above, for you, in order to enhance your career as a talent, and get you some jobs, some bookings or some sales, depending on what you have to offer.

    Also, there are very low barriers to entry to most creative fields, since everyone can become a player in that field without having to obtain a particular practising license or authorisation from one’s government to become an artist, a book author, a painter, an actor, a film director, etc.

    Indeed, unlike regulated industries, such as the legal profession, the medical profession, the accountancy profession, the banking and finance profession, creatives do not need to pass any stringent test or exam to be granted the right to work their creative jobs.

    Therefore, the gatekeepers in the creative industries are the agents: since it is in their interest to only work with the best talent, they will pick and choose only the most successful and skilled gamers, designers, artists, painters, actors, film directors, writers, models, music composers, etc. to represent.

    So, if you want to be part of the club, in your creative field, and land those big fat contracts, you must find yourself a good agent.

    2. How do you find an agent?

    Most of the time, it is by word of mouth, or through connections that one finds an agent.

    Of course, being an alumni from a prestigious creative school, such as the National Film and Television School (‟NFTS”), in the UK, or the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art (‟RADA”) helps tremendously, especially since agents love mingling with young graduates there, attending their final and graduation presentations and reviewing their final graduation projects, to assess the amount of talent such graduates may have.

    Think Alexander McQueen, the famed, and now deceased, fashion designer who was immediately spotted as a major player among top fashion designers, by the most elitist fashion press, when he presented his MA graduation collection, at his college Saint Martin’s in 1992.

    Having a family member or friend in the business also helps, and there are countless examples of film actors who gave a major push to their offsprings, in France, the UK and the United States (‟US”) by ‟connecting them” to their agents.

    If you are not one for nepotism, then you could also approach and cold-call the best agents for your particular creative field, and present them with your portfolio of works and CV, in the hopes that they will retain you as their client. However, this route is the toughest one, and you will probably get a lot of rejections, if and when you get picked by an agent.

    The web is an excellent source of information to find the best agents in your creative field, in France, the UK and the US.

    For example, on the best articles I have ever read on the highly-secretive agenting business is ‟Le fascinant business des agents de stars”, which dissects the rarified group of famous acting agents in Paris, France.

    3. How will your relationship with the agent work?

    The agenting business is mostly an unregulated one, although France, ever the formalistic one, has put in place some rules and regulations relating to the agenting profession in its labour code and a decree on the remuneration of artistic agents, which caps the agents’ earnings at 10 percent of the gross remunerations paid to the talent.

    The excellent French streaming series, ‟10 pour cent (‟Call my agent” on English streaming channels) gives a great example of what acting agents do, for a mere 10 percent of the actors’ earnings.

    In the UK and the US, there is way more of a ‟laissez-faire” approach to the agenting business, although the UK has some statutory regulations set out in the Employment Agencies Act 1973 and the Employment Businesses Regulations 2003, which set some standards in terms of:

    • providing relevant information and advice to the agents’ clients (i.e. the talent);
    • conducting all affairs on behalf of the agents’ clients, and
    • keeping records, in particular of the contracts and visa application processes, entered into by the agents’ clients during the course of the creative activities.

    UK and US agents usually get 15 percent commissions, although I have seen percentage rates going as high as 50 percent, in the case of art galleries selling consigned art works on behalf of artists they represent.

    These discrepancies in the commission rates, and the various obligations owed by the agent to the talent, are caused by the variance in the provisions set out in the representation agreements entered into between the talent and his or her agent. Since the ‟freedom to contract” principle applies, the terms of the contractual agreements entered into between the parties are left mostly to the freedom of those parties, except for the rare statutory points mentioned above.

    Very often, at our law firm Crefovi, we get approached by creatives who signed very poorly drafted, and very unbalanced, representation agreements with their agents in the past. Therefore, we support them in terminating such agenting agreements, while attempting to recover any earning unpaid to them by these agents.

    Therefore, as a talent, it is always advisable to instruct an entertainment lawyer, in order to review, amend and negotiate the terms of any draft representation agreement sent by the agent, before such talent signs it.

    Also, it is useful to become a member of a trade union for creative practitioners, such as Equity, which may provide you with ongoing career, business and legal advice, along the way.

    If you want to be successful in the arts, you need a top agent in your creative field to represent you. However, an agent is not your friend, but your future business partner, so you need to establish some clear, transparent and fair working conditions with him or her, from the outset. The best way to achieve this is to instruct a seasoned entertainment lawyer, like us at Crefovi, to negotiate such representation agreement for you. Then, it should be plain sailing, a lot of hard work and, hopefully, success and recognition at the end of the line, in your creative field!



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      How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?

      In the creative industries, many intellectual property rights, such as copyright, trademarks, registered designs and patents, are subjected to licenses, in order for right owners and creators to monetize such rights. However, things do not always go smoothly during and after the term of the licensing agreement, between the licensor and the licensee. Therefore, what are the remedies that the licensor may put in place, in order to ensure that his or her intellectual property rights are fairly monetised? How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?

      How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?1. What is a license agreement?

      A license is the contract which authorises the use of a certain intellectual property right (‟IPRs”), be it copyright, a trademark, a design or a patent, for commercial purposes, by a licensee, in exchange for the payment of royalties to the licensor, i.e. the right owner. These royalties are usually computed as a percentage of the turnover generated by the sale of products manufactured, or services provided, by the licensee under this license agreement.

      A license is different from an assignment agreement, in that the former has a limited term, whereby the authorisation to use the IPRs granted to the licensee by the licensor will expire, after a period of time explicitly set out in the license agreement. On the contrary, an assignment is a perpetual and irreversible transfer of ownership of some designated IPRs, from the assignor to the assignee, in exchange for the payment of a consideration (usually, a one-off sum of money).

      To resume, a license is temporary and reversible upon expiry of a term, while an assignment is irrevocable and irreversible if made for consideration.

      2. How are licenses used in the creative industries?

      Licenses are often used in the creative industries, in order for creatives to monetise the IPRs that they created.

      For example, in the music industry, many copyright licenses are entered into, in order for music distributors to distribute the masters of sound recordings to new territories, which are difficult to reach for the music label which owns such masters because this label is located in a totally different geographical area. Therefore, the licensor, the music label, relies on the expertise of the local licensee, the national distributor, to put in place the best local strategy to broadcast the masters of its sound recordings, via radio plays, local streaming websites, TV broadcasting, and then to generate revenues through these various income streams and local neighbouring rights collecting societies.

      Another example of a copyright license, in the fashion and luxury sectors, is when a brand commissions an artist or designer to make some drawings and designs, which the brand will then display on its website(s), as well as in its various stores. These drawings and designs being protected by copyright, the brand, as licensee, will enter into a license agreement with the artist, as licensor, to obtain the right to use these drawings and designs in set locations and premises of this brand.

      Licenses are also extremely widely used in the context of trademarks, especially with respect to distribution of luxury and fashion products on new geographical territories by local distributors (who need to have the right to use the trademark to advertise, market and open retail locations), and also with respect to deals where the licensee manufactures products in which it has a lot of expertise (such as perfumes, cosmetics, children’s garments), which the licensee then sells under the trademark of a famous fashion or luxury brand, i.e. the licensor.

      In the technology sector, patent and/or copyright licenses are the norm. Indeed, softwares and sources codes are protected by copyright, so many tech companies make a living licensing their copyright into such inventions, to their retail or business customers, in exchange for some royalties and/or licensing fees. As far as technological products are concerned, those can be protected by patents, provided that they are novel, that an inventive step was present in creating such products, and that the invention is capable of industrial application. Therefore, most technological hardware products, such as mobile phones, computers, tablets, are protected by patents. And whenever there is a dichotomy between the creator of these products, and the manufacturers and distributors of such products, then some patent license agreements are entered into.

      Technology licenses are, indeed, so critical, that fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (‟FRAND”) have been set up in order to level the playing field: FRAND terms denote a voluntary licensing commitment that standards organisations often request from the owner of an IPR (usually a patent) which is, or may become, essential to practice a technical standard. One of the most common policies, is for the standard- setting organisation to require from a patent holder that it voluntarily agrees to include its patented technology in the standard, by licensing that technology on FRAND terms. Failing or refusing to license IPRs on FRAND terms could even be deemed to infringe antitrust rules, in particular those of the European Union (‟EU”). For example, the EU commission sent a statement of objections to Motorola Mobility, for breach of EU antitrust rules, over its attempt to enforce a patent infringement injunction against Apple in Germany. The patents in question relate to GPRS, a part of the GSM standard, which is used to make mobile phone calls. Motorola accepted that these patents were standard essential patents and had, therefore, agreed that they would be licensed to Apple on FRAND terms. However, in 2011, Motorola tried to take out, and enforce, a patent infringement injunction against Apple in Germany, based on those patents, even although Apple had said that it was willing to pay royalties, to use the patented technology. Samsung was also the recipient of a statement of objections from the EU commission, after it sought patent infringement injunctions to ‟prevent Apple from infringing patents”, despite Apple apparently being willing to pay a license fee and negotiate a license on FRAND terms.

      3. How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran: what to do if the license has expired but your licensee keeps on using your IPRs?

      Due to poor management and in-house record-keeping, as well as human resources disorganisation and high turnover rate of staff, the licensee may breach the licensing agreement by keeping on using the licensed IPR, although the license agreement has reached its term.

      For example, in the above-mentioned case of the copyright license on some masters of sound recordings, the French local distributors and licensees of such masters overran the term of the license and kept on collecting royalties and revenues on those masters, in particular from French neighbouring rights collecting societies, well after the date of termination of this license. How, on earth, could have this happened? Well, as I experienced first hand at the music trade show Midem, many music distributors, labels and catalogues’ owners, such as music publishers, often mingle together in order to buy and sell to each other music catalogues, be it of copyrighted musical compositions and lyrics, or of copyrighted masters of sound recordings. Therefore, the terms of the first license agreement, between the licensor and the initial first licensee, become more and more blurry and forgotten, with basic provisions, such as the duration of the initial license, being conveniently lost into oblivion by the generation of successive licensees. Yes, I guarantee you, it happens very often.

      Another example, relating to the above-mentioned case of a copyright license granted by an artist, on his drawings and designs commissioned by a luxury brand, which used these drawings on its website(s) and stores, in order to promote its luxury products … even after the termination date of the license!

      So what can a licensor do, when he or she notices that the licensee has, or is, breaching the terms of the license agreement by overrunning its duration? How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?

      First and foremost, the licensor must gather as much pieces of evidence as possible of such breach of the term of the license agreement, by the licensee. For example, the music label, licensor, may reach out to French neighbouring rights collecting societies and ask for the royalties statements for the French distributor, ex-licensee, up-to-date, in order to have some indisputable evidence that this ex-licensee kept on collecting the neighbouring rights royalties on the sound recordings which were the subject of the license, even after the termination date of this license. The French artist, whose designs and drawings kept on being used by the luxury brand after the term of his license with this brand expired, instructed our law firm to liaise with a French bailiff, in order to have this bailiff execute a detailed report of copyright infringement on internet, by taking snapshots of the webpages of this brand’s website displaying his drawings and designs.

      These pieces of evidence are indispensable, in order to prove the IPR infringement (since the license expired), to show it to the ex-licensee, if necessary, and to use it in any future lawsuit for IPR infringement lodged with a local court, if and when the ex-licensee refuses to settle further to receiving the ex-licensor’s letter before court action.

      You will have guessed by now that, indeed, once the ex-licensor has gathered as much conclusive evidence as possible that his or her IPR is being infringed by the ex-licensee because the latter keeps on using such IPR outside the contractual framework of the now-expired license agreement, the second stage is to instruct counsel, in the country where such IPR infringement is taking place, and have such counsel send a robust, cordial yet frank letter before court action to the ex-licensor, asking:

      • for the immediate cessation of any IPR infringement act, by stopping using the IPR at once;
      • for the evidence of, and information about, turnover and sales, relating to the sale of products and/or services, generated thanks to the use of the IPR beyond the term of the expired license, and
      • for the restitution of all those revenues generated by the sale of those products and/or services, generated thanks to the use of the IPR beyond the term of the expired license, as well as accrued late payment interests at the statutory interest rate,

      within a short deadline (usually, no longer than 14 days).

      Here, the ex-licensee has an option: either it decides to cave in and avoid a tarnished reputation by immediately complying with the terms of the ex-licensor’s letter before court action, or it may decide to act as a blowhard and ignore the requests set out in this letter. The first approach is favoured by anglo-saxon companies, while the second option is usual among French, and all other Mediterranean, ex-licensees.

      If the dispute may be resolved out-of-court, a settlement agreement will be drafted, negotiated and finalised, by the lawyers advising the ex-licensor and the ex-licensee, which will provide for the restitution of a very clearly defined sum of money, representing the sales generated by the ex-licensee during the period in which it overran the use of the litigious IPR.

      If the dispute cannot be resolved out-of-court, then the ex-licensor will have no other option left than to lodge a lawsuit for IPR infringement against the ex-licensee, which – provided the former has strong evidence of such breach of licensing agreement – it will won.

      Once the slate is clean again, i.e. after the ex-licensee has paid damages or restituted sums to the ex-licensor with respect to its use of the IPR after the termination date of the first license agreement, then ex-licensor and the ex-licensee may decide to resume doing business together. Here, I strongly advise that the parties draft a transparent, clear and straightforward new license agreement, which clearly sets out the termination date of this new future license, and foreseeable consequences in case the future licensee keeps on using the IPR beyond the end of such termination date. Using the services of either in-house lawyer or external counsel is very much advisable, in this instance, in order to avoid a repeat of the messy and damaging business situation which occured in the first place, between the licensor and the licensee.



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        Cancel culture: how the creative industries should ride out the storm

        Cancel culture is upon us. This is what we are currently being told by British and French mass media, who have finally caught up with the content of the latest, and first non-fictional, book ever published by acclaimed, yet heavily criticised, American author Bret Easton Ellis, ‟White”. The polemic rages on both sides of the pond, ignited by more than 150 public figures signing a controversial letter denouncing cancel culture. So, what’s going on? What is ‟cancel culture”? Why should you pay attention to, and be cautious about it, as a creative professional? Is this even a thing in Europe and, in particular, in France and the United Kingdom? If so, how should you position yourself, as a creative, on, and about, cancel culture?

        Cancel culture1. What is it? Where does it come from?

        Following the 1990s’ culture wars, which sprung up in the United States of America as a way of denouncing and forbidding contemporary art exhibitions and other medium of creative expression judged by those instigating such culture wars as indecent and obscene, ‟cancel culture” has taken off in the early 2000s on social media, and has since become a cultural phenomenon in the USA and Canada – especially in the last five years or so – pervading every aspect of Northern America’s mass media.

        ‟Cancel culture” refers to the popular desire, and practice, of withdrawing support for (i.e. cancelling) public figures, communities or corporations, after they have done or said something considered objectionable or offensive. ‟Cancel culture” is generally performed on social media, in the form of group online shaming.

        Therefore, as a result of something said or done, which triggered negative reactions and emotions such as anger, disgust, annoyance and hate from some members of the public, a natural person or legal entity or group of natural persons ends up being publicly shamed and humiliated, on internet, via social media platforms (such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) and/or more localised media (such as email groups). Online shaming takes many forms, including call-outs, cancellation or cancel culture, doxing, negative reviews, and revenge porn.

        While the culture wars of the 1990s were driven by right-wing religious and conservative individuals in the US (triggered by ‟hot-button” defining issues such as abortion, gun politics, separation of church and state, privacy, recreational drug use, homosexuality), the cancel culture of our 21st century is actually a left-leaning supposedly ‟progressive” identity movement which has taken hold in recent years due to the conversations prompted by #MeToo and other movements that demand greater accountability from public figures. According to the website Merriam-Webster, ‟the term has been credited to black users of Twitter, where it has been used as a hashtag. As troubling information comes to light regarding celebrities who were once popular, such as Bill Cosby, Michael Jackson, Roseanne Barr and Louis C.K. – so come calls to cancel such figures”.

        Yep. Check out your Twitter feed by typing in the search bar the hashtags #cancelled, #cancel or #cancel[then name of the individual, company, organisation you think might be cancelled], and you will be able to review the top current cancellation campaigns and movements launched against Netflix, British actress Millie Bobby Brown, twitter user @GoatPancakes_, etc.

        So under the guise of defending laudable causes such as the recognition of the LGBTQ community and fighting against racism, sexism, sexual assault, homophobia, transphobia, etc., some communities of online ‟righteous” vigilante use violent methods, such as cancellation, in order to administer a virtual punishment to those who are on their radar.

        This call-out and cancel culture is becoming so pervasive and effective that people lose their jobs over a tweet, some upsetting jokes or inappropriate remarks.

        The Roseanne Barr’s story is the ultimate cancellation example, since her ABC show, ‟Roseanne”, was terminated with immediate effect, after Ms Barr posted a tweet about Valerie Jarrett, an African-American woman who was a senior advisor to Barack Obama throughout his presidency and considered one of his most influential aides. R. Barr wrote, in her litigious tweet, if the ‟muslim brotherhood & planet of the apes had a baby = vj”. Whilst Ms Barr’s remark was undoubtedly in extreme bad taste, it is fair to ask whether her tweet – which could have easily been deleted from Twitter to remove such kick well below the belt dealt to Ms Jarrett – justified wrecking Ms Barr’s long-lasting entertainment and broadcasting career in one instant, permanently and for eternity.

        To conclude, social media channels have become the platforms of virtual trials, where justice (i.e. cancellation) is administered in an expeditious manner, with no possibility of dialogue, forgiveness and/or statute of limitation. This arbitrary mass justice movement is not only cruel, but tends to put everything under the same umbrella, indiscriminately: so a person who cracked a sexist joke on Twitter would become vilified and even ‟cancelled”, in the same manner than an individual effectively sentenced for sexual assault by an actual court of justice.

        How did we get to this point? Why does a growing number of Northern Americans feel the uncontrollable need to call-out, cancel and violently pillory some of their public figures, corporations and communities?

        A pertinent analysis, although skewed by a European perspective, is that made by French sociologist Nathalie Heinich in French newspaper Le Monde and explained on the podcast ‟Histoire d’Amériques”, dedicated to Bret Easton Ellis’ ‟White”.

        According to Ms Heinich, there is no legal limitation to freedom of speech – a personal liberty which is enshrined in the first amendment to the US constitution, in the USA. As a consequence, the US congress cannot adopt laws which may limit or curb freedom of expression, as is set out in this first amendment. Therefore, according to N. Heinich, since the US authorities cannot forbid speech and freedom of expression, it is down to US citizens to take on the role of vigilante and organise spectacular information and public campaigns, in order to request the prohibition of such expression and such speech.

        This analysis made by this French sociologist needs to be nuanced: whilst it is true that no US statute or law may curtail freedom of speech in the USA, there is consistent and ample body of case law and common law, which rule on the categories of speech that are given lesser or no protection by the first amendment of the Bill of rights. Those exceptions include:

        • incitement (i.e. the advocacy of the use of force when it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, Brandenburg v Ohio (1969));
        • incitement to suicide (in 2017, a juvenile court in Massachusetts, USA, ruled that repeatedly encouraging someone to complete suicide was not protected by the first amendment);
        • false statement of fact and defamation (Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc. (1974));
        • obscenity (Miller v California (1973) established the Miller test whereby speech is unprotected if ‟the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the subject or work in question, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”, and ‟the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law”, and ‟the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value”), and
        • child pornography (New York v. Ferber (1982) which ruled that if speech or expression is classified under the child pornography exception at all, it becomes unprotected).

        Therefore, there are some common law exceptions to the first amendment consecrating freedom of speech in the USA, but they are few and far between, and they need to be hotly, and expensively, debated in court, probably months or years after the triggering content was made available in the public space in the first instance, before being found, by a court, unprotected by freedom of speech, in favour of higher public policy interests.

        As a result, many American and Canadian citizens resort to violent tactics, in order to request the immediate, swiftly-enforced and free of legal fees and court fees, prohibition of controversial art exhibitions, entertainment shows, movies, jokes, remarks, etc. first through the 1990s culture wars, and now through the 21st century’s cancel culture.

        This is paradoxical since cancel culture and call-out culture are some of the tools used to advocate for worthy causes such as fighting against racism, sexism, sexual predation and aggression, promoting LGBTQ rights. However, the methods used, through cancel culture and online shaming, to achieve those laudable goals, are very violent and totalitarian, all taking place in the virtual realm of social media, but with very serious and long-lasting ‟real-life” consequences such as loss of employment, loss of reputation, self-harm and sometimes, suicide.

        2. Can cancel culture enter through our European borders, in particular in France and the United Kingdom?

        I hate to break it to you, but cancel culture is already upon us in France and the United Kingdom. We are in a globalised world, all of us are online and check the media and social media from all over the world, thanks to the internet. So this Northern American trend has, of course, reached our European shores.

        It is worth noting that the recognition of ‟cancel culture”, and the realisation that is has become a sizable part of online culture, took place in the United Kingdom (‟UK”) at the beginning of the year 2020, when British television presenter and socialite Caroline Flack committed suicide allegedly because she was vilified on social media and by British tabloids, further to being sacked from British reality show ‟Love Island”. This UK epiphany about ‟cancel culture” arrived earlier than elsewhere in Europe, probably due to the shared language, and culture, that the British have with Americans and Canadians.

        France is only now getting familiar with this new concept of ‟cancel culture”, further to hearing about the ‟letter on justice and open debate”, drafted, and signed, in July 2020, by more than 150 global intellectuals and authors (among whom Margaret Atwood, Wynton Marsalis, Noam Chomsky, J.K. Rowling and Salman Rushdie), and denouncing the excesses of online shaming and cancel culture. France is currently going through a phase of introspection, asking itself whether ‟la culture de l’annulation” could take off on its Gallic shores. And it is.

        Proof is, I was interviewed for the 8.00pm TV News of France TV on Sunday 20 September 2020, to discuss the attempts made by no less than the new very controversial French minister of the interior, Gerald Darmanin – who was himself under criminal investigation for sexual coercion, harassment and misconduct in 2009, and then again between 2014 and 2017 – to eradicate from all SVoD services platforms such as YouTube, Spotify, Deezer, Dailymotion, the release of the first music album created by Franco-Senegalese 28 years’ old rapper, Freeze Corleone, ‟La Menace Fantôme” (‟LMF”). On which grounds is such cancellation requested? Provoking racial hatred and racial slander, no less.

        Artist Freeze Corleone is an uncompromising rapper, abundantly peppering his raps with the French translations of ‟nigger” (‟négro”) and ‟bitches” (‟pétasses”) in the purest Northern American rap tradition (F. Corleone lived in Montreal, Canada, before settling down in Dakar, Senegal). He also obscurely refers to ‟Adolf”, ‟Goebbels”, ‟Ben Laden” and ‟Sion” in his rather enigmatic LMF lyrics. However, qualifying his body of work in LMF as racial slander and/or provoking racial hatred is a stretch. If you do not like it, because this content triggers you, just move on and don’t listen to it.

        Freedom of speech is enshrined in the French declaration of rights of the human being and citizen, dated 1789. Article 11 of such declaration provides that the ‟free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of the human being: any Citizen may therefore speak, write, print freely, except where he or she has to answer for the abuse of such freedom in specific cases provided by law”.

        And such specific cases where freedom of speech may be curtailed, under French statutory law, include:

        • Law dated 1881 on the freedom of the press which, while recognising freedom of speech in all publication formats, provides for four criminally-reprehensible exceptions, which are insults, defamation and slander, incentivising the perpetration of criminal offences, if it is followed by acts, as well as gross indecency;
        • Law dated 1972 against opinions provoking racial hatred, which – like the four above-mentioned exceptions, is a criminal offense provided for in the French criminal code;
        • Law dated 1990 against revisionist opinions, which is also a criminal offense in order to penalise those who contest the materiality and factuality of the atrocities committed by the Nazis on minorities, such as Jews, homosexuals and gypsies before and during world war two, and
        • Law dated July 2019 against hateful content on internet, which provisions (requiring to remove all terrorist, pedopornographic, hateful and pornographic content from any website within 24 hours) were almost completely censored by the French constitutional council as a disproportionate infringement to freedom of speech, before entering into force in its expurgated finalised version later on in 2019.

        Therefore, according to French sociologist Nathalie Heinich, France does not need ‟cancel culture” because freedom of speech is already strictly corseted by French statutory laws. By this, she means that French individuals won’t have to take to social media platforms, in order to ‟cancel” whoever is misbehaving, since the all-pervading French nanny state will strike the first blow to the ‟offender”, in the same manner than French minister of justice G. Darmanin unilaterally requested all cultural streaming and video platforms, from YouTube to Spotify and Deezer, as well as all French radio and TV channels, to immediately and permanently remove the songs of Freeze Corleone’s LMF, further to opening a criminal inquiry against the latter, for allegedly committing racial slander and/or provoking racial hatred through his lyrics.

        Is this above-mentioned French regal method a better tool than having the populace publicly decrying and shaming an individual who ‟steps out of line”, by using ‟cancel culture”? By no means, because, at the end of the day, it’s our collective freedom of speech which is being breached and infringed, on a whim. And that is unacceptable, in a democracy.

        On the other side of the channel, the legal framework around freedom of speech is no panacea either. Freedom of expression is usually ruled through common law, in the UK. However, in 1998, the UK transposed the provisions of the European Convention on human rights – which article 10 provides for the guarantee of freedom of expression – into domestic law, by way of its Human rights act 1998.

        Not only is freedom of expression tightly delineated, in article 12 (Freedom of expression) of the Human rights act 1998, but there is a broad sweep of exceptions to it, under UK common and statutory law. In particular, the following common law and statutory offences, narrowly limit freedom of speech in the UK:

        • threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour intending or likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, or cause a breach of the peace (which has been used to prohibit racist speech targeted at individuals);
        • sending any letter or article which is indecent or grossly offensive with an intent to cause distress or anxiety (which has been used to prohibit speech of a racist or anti-religious nature, as well as some posts on social networks), governed by the Malicious communications act 1988 and the Communications act 2003;
        • incitement (i.e. the encouragement to another person to commit a crime);
        • incitement to racial hatred;
        • incitement to religious hatred;
        • incitement to terrorism, including encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications;
        • glorifying terrorism;
        • collection or possession of a document or record containing information likely to be of use to a terrorist;
        • treason including advocating for the abolition of the monarchy or compassing or imagining the death of the monarch;
        • obscenity;
        • indecency including corruption of public morals and outraging public decency;
        • defamation and loss of reputation, which legal framework is set out in the Defamation act 2013;
        • restrictions on court reporting including names of victims and evidence and prejudicing or interfering with court proceedings;
        • prohibition of post-trial interviews with jurors, and
        • harassment.

        In Europe, and in particular in France and the UK, there is already a tight leash on freedom of speech, whether at common law or statutory law. However, ‟cancel culture” is nonetheless permeating our European online shores, following the trend started in Northern America. As a result, it is a tough time to be a free and creative European citizen, let alone a public figure or corporation, in this 21st century Europe. Indeed, not only could you have trouble with the law, if you were to make triggering or contentious comments or jokes or lyrics in the public domain, but you could also be shot down in flames by the online community, on social media, for your speech and expression.

        3. How to ride the storm of ‟cancel culture”, while remaining consistently creative and productive?

        In the above-mentioned cultural and legal context, it is crucial for creative professionals to think long and hard before posting, broadcasting, speaking, and even behaving.

        As a result, book publishers use the services of ‟sensitivity readers”, before releasing a new work, whereby such consultants read books to be published, in order to look for, and find out, any clichés, stereotypes, scenes, formulations that may offend a part of the readership. This use of sensitivity readers is becoming more and more systematic, especially when the author speaks about themes which he, or she, does not personally master.

        For example, an heterosexual author who describes a gay character, or a white author who describes Mexicans, in his or her new book, will most definitely have a sensitivity consultant review his or her output before publication. Almost inevitably, such sensitivity reader will request that some changes be made to the written content, so as to avoid a boycott of the published book, or cancellation of the author and book, altogether.

        Whilst some of the classics of global literature were perceived as very shocking when they were first released (think ‟Lolita” from Vladimir Nabokov about the obsession of a middle-aged literature professor with a 12 year’s old girl, which today would probably be described as a glorification of pedophilia), they would probably never see the light of day, if they were to be published in our era.

        Therefore, today’s cultural sensitivities push towards the publication and broadcasting, of written, audio and visual creative content which is bland, right-thinking, watered-down, in which the author only refers to what he or she knows, in the most neutral way possible.

        This need to use ‟auto-censorship” in any content a creator wishes to publish is compounded by the fact that today, consumers of creative content do not differentiate between the author of the work, and his or her creative output. There is no separation between the author and content creator, and his or her body of work and/or fictional characters. With Millenials and US universities becoming obsessed with identity questions (i.e. the identity or feeling of belonging to a group, such as the gay community, the black community, etc.), it is the person who writes the book, or song, or writes or directs a film, who is now also important, maybe even more important than the work itself.

        As a result, any content creator who writes or sings or produces an audiovisual work about a community other than his or her own, may be accused of cultural appropriation (i.e. the adoption of an element or elements of one culture or identity by members of another culture or identity) and even become the object of victimhood culture (i.e. a term coined by sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning, in their 2018 book ‟The rise of victimhood culture: microaggressions, safe spaces and the new culture wars”, to describe the attitude whereby the victims publicize microaggressions to call attention to what they see as the deviant behaviour of the offenders, thereby calling attention to their own victimization, lowering the offender’s moral status and raising their own moral status).

        In this climate, it is therefore easier to publish or broadcast creative content if you belong to a minority (by being, for example, homosexual, black, brown, or a female), while white heterosexual male creators have definitely become disadvantaged, and more susceptible to being targets of ‟cancel culture”.

        To conclude, a lot of prior thoughts and research and preparation and planning need to be put into the creation, and then broadcasting and publication, of any creative content today, not only with respect to such output, but also in relation to the identity, and positioning, of his or her author. If this conscious effort of adhering to right-thinking and bland ideologies is appropriately and astutely done, you and your creative output may successfully ride the storm of, not only French and UK legal limitations to your freedom of expression, but also the nasty impact of cancel culture and online shaming, hence maximising your chances that your creative work generates a commercial success.



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          Do you need to put in place an escrow agreement with respect to the software and/or source code that you license?

          In this digital and technological corporate world, having a plan B in case your software or computer program license goes wrong is a must. Can a customer successfully leverage its position, by entering into an escrow agreement with the licensor? How does the source code escrow work, anyway? When can the source escrow be released to the licensee?

          escrow agreement1. What is software escrow and source code escrow?

          1.1. What is source code?

          Source code is the version of software as it is originally written (i.e. typed into a computer) by a human in plain text (i.e. human readable alphanumeric characters), according to the Linux Information Project.

          The notion of source code may also be taken more broadly, to include machine code and notations in graphical languages, neither of which are textual in nature.

          For example, during a presentation to peers or potential clients, the software creator may ascertain from the outset that, ‟for the purpose of clarity, ‟source code” is taken to mean any fully executable description of a software system. It is therefore construed to include machine code, very high level languages and executable graphical representations of systems”.

          Often, there are several steps of program translation or minification (i.e. the process of removing all unnecessary characters from the source code of interpreted programming languages or markup languages, without changing its functionality) between the original source code typed by a human and an executable program.

          Source code is primarily used as input to the process that produces an executable computer programme (i.e. it is compiled or interpreted). Hence, computer programmers often find it useful to review existing source code to learn about programming techniques. So much so, that sharing of source code between developers is frequently cited as a contributing factor to the maturation of their programming skills.

          Moreover, porting software to other computer platforms is usually prohibitively difficult – if not impossible – without source code.

          1.2. Legal status of software, computer programs and source code

          In the United Kingdom, section 3 (Literary, dramatic and musical works) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‟CDPA 1988”) provides that among works which are protected by copyright, are ‟computer programs”, ‟preparatory design material for a computer program” and ‟databases” (i.e. collections of independent works, data or other materials which are arranged in a systematic or methodical way and are individually accessible by electronic or other means).

          Section 3A of the CDPA 1988 provides that the standard for copyright protection is higher, for databases, than for other ‟literary works”, since they must be original (i.e. by reason of the selection or arrangement of the contents of the database, the database constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation). Since the CDPA 1988 has no equivalent provision for computer programs, it is common knowledge that the provisions of section 3A of the CDPA 1988, relating to originality, apply to both databases and computer programs.

          Moreover, the European Directive on the legal protection of databases (Directive 96/9/EC) and the Computer Directive (Directive 91/250/EEC) confirm these higher standards of originality for computer programs and databases, in the sense that they are the author’s own intellectual creation. This is a higher standard of originality than ‟skill, labour and judgment”.

          Article L112-2 of the French intellectual property code (‟IPC”) provides that softwares, including preliminary conception work, are deemed to be ‘works from the mind’ protected by copyright. That copyright protection includes source code.

          Both in France and the UK, the duration of copyright for software and computer programs is 70 years after the death of the author or, if the author is a legal entity, from the date on which the software was made public.

          Copyright is acquired automatically in France and the UK, upon creation of the software or computer program, without any need for registration of such intellectual property right.

          Both under English and French law, computer programs are regarded as not protectable via other registered intellectual property rights, such as patents. Indeed, section 1(2) (c) of the Patents Act 1977 (‟PA 1977”) lists computer programs among the things that are not regarded as being inventions “as such”. Article L611-10 of the IPC does the same in France.

          1.3. Software escrow / source code escrow

          Since authors of software and computer programs – which include source code – own the copyright to their work, they can licence these works. Indeed, the author has the right to grant customers and users of his software some of his exclusive rights in form of software licensing.

          While some softwares are ‟open source”, i.e. free to use, distribute, modify and study, most softwares are ‟proprietary”, i.e. privately owned, restricted and, sometimes, kept secret.

          For proprietary software, the only way for a user to have lawful access to it is by obtaining a license to use from its author.

          When some very large sums of money are exchanged, between the licensor (i.e. the author of the software and source code) and its licensees (i.e. the users of such software and source code), a precautionary measure may be required by the latter: software escrow.

          It is the deposit of software source code with a third-party escrow agent, such as Iron Mountain or SES. The source code is securely administered by a trusted, neutral third party to protect the developer’s intellectual property, while at the same time keeping a copy safe for the licensees in case anything happens, such as the licensor no longer being able to support the software or going into bankruptcy. If that situation materialises, the licensees request a release of the source code from the escrow account and are able to keep their businesses up and running. This escrow solution effectively gives the licensee control of the source code and options to move forward.

          2. How do you put source code escrow in place?

          Many organisations have a standing policy to require software developers to escrow source code of products the organisations are licensing.

          Therefore, alongside the licensing agreement to use the computer program, in-house or external lawyers of the licensees also negotiate the terms of an escrow agreement pursuant to which the source code of that computer program will be put in escrow with a trusted third party.

          3. Is it worth requesting source code escrow alongside a software license?

          Only a small percentage of escrows are ever released: Iron Mountain, the dominant escrow agent in the USA, has thousands of escrow accounts and more than 45,000 customers worldwide that have stored their software and source code with them. Over the 10-year period from 1990 to 1999, Iron Mountain released 96 escrow accounts, less than 10 per year.

          Just as well, because escrow agreements are entered into as a kind of insurance policy, only to be used in case something goes very wrong at the licensor’s company, which triggers one of the release events (insolvency, case of force majeure, death of the computer developer, etc.).

          However, one valid cons is that most escrowed source code is defective: often, upon release, source code fails to provide adequate protection because it is outdated, defective or fails to meet the licensee’s needs. According to Iron Mountain again, 97.4 percent of all analysed escrow material deposits have been found incomplete and 74 percent have required additional input from developers to be compiled. This is a valid point and licensees of the software, who insist on getting an escrow agreement as well, must insert some clauses in the escrow agreement whereby the escrowed source code is tested on a very regular basis by both the licensee and the licensor, in order to ensure that such escrowed source code will be usable as soon as one ‟release event”, set out in the escrow agreement, materialises. The licensor should have an obligation of result to maintain the escrowed source code up-to-date and fully operational, throughout the duration of the escrow agreement.

          Another point of caution is that licensees may lack the expertise to use the released source code. Even if the licensor has been diligent and the released source code is properly updated, well-documented and fully operational, most licensees lack the technical resources or capability to utilise the source code upon release. The licensees may work around this problem by either hiring an engineer who has the technical knowledge to make the most of that released source code (bearing in mind that most software licensing agreements bar licensees from poaching licensor’s employees during the term of the license) or instructing a third-party software company. The best and most economical approach is to be as autonomous as possible, as a licensee, by developing in-house expertise on the workings of the software, and its source code, even before one of the release events materialises.

          Another identified problem is that software licensors may prevent the timely release of the escrowed source code by imposing some unilateral conditions to the release, such as the vendor having to provide its written prior approval before the source code is released by the escrow agent, upon the materialisation of a release event. Additionally, many escrow agreements require parties to participate in lengthy alternative dispute resolution proceedings, such as arbitration or mediation, in the event of a dispute relating to the release of the source code. A commonly disputed issue is whether a release event actually occurred, even when the software licensor has gone into bankruptcy! The long delay and expensive legal battle needed to obtain the source code release, may become very heavy burdens for a licensee, compounded by the difficulty to keep the licensee’s computer program and software working – as the licensor, and its technical support, have faded away. In order to avoid such delays and complications in the release of the escrowed source code, the terms of the escrow agreement must initially be reviewed, and negotiated, by an IT lawyer experienced in this area, so that all clauses are watertight and can be executed immediately and in a smooth manner, upon the occurrence of a release event.

          Another cost consideration is that the expenses related to the opening and maintenance of an escrow agreement are high, and typically borne by the licensee. In addition to the fees paid to the escrow agent, the customer will often incur significant legal expenses related to the drafting and negotiation of the escrow agreement, as explained above. Software licensors being really resistant to providing their proprietary source code to anyone, escrow agreements are often subjects of long negotiations, before they are signed. However, while doing a costs/benefits analysis of getting the source code escrow, the licensee must assess how much it would cost, in case a release event occurred (bankruptcy of the licensor, case of force majeure, etc) but no prior software escrow had been put in place. If the licensee has made a considerable investment in the software, the cost to protect this asset via an escrow agreement may be trivial.

          Some companies say that, since they now rely on Software-as-a-Service solutions (‟SaaS”) for some of their IT needs and functionalities, there is no need for software escrow because the SaaS relies on a cloud-based system. However, SaaS implies that you need to think about both the software and your company’s data, which is indeed stored on the cloud – which adds a level of complexity. Since most SaaS provider’s business continuity/disaster recovery plans do not extend to a company’s application and data, some new insurance products have entered the market, combining both the source code escrow and disaster recovery and risk management solution. For example, Iron Mountain markets its SaaSProtect Solutions for business continuity.

          To conclude, licensees need to conduct a costs/benefits analysis of having an escrow agreement in place, alongside the licensing agreement of their major software applications, in respect of each computer program which is perceived as absolutely paramount to the economic survival, and business continuity, of the licensees. Once they have balanced out the pros and cons of putting in place escrow agreements, they need to draft a list of their essential ‟wants” to be set out in each escrow agreement (for example, a detailed list of the release events which would trigger the release of source code to the licensee, the quarterly obligation borne by the licensor to maintain the source code in up-to-date form and working order, the secondment of a highly qualified computer programmer employee of the licensor to the offices of the licensee, on a full-time or part-time basis, in order to train in-house IT staff about the intricacies of the software and its source code) and then pass on such list to their instructed lawyer – who should be an IT expert lawyer, seasoned in reviewing and negotiating escrow agreements – for his or her review and constructive criticism and feedback. Once the licensees have agreed an ‟escrow insurance plan” strategy internally, and then with their counsel, they need to contact the licensor, its management and legal team, and circulate to them a term sheet of the future escrow agreement, in order to kick off the negotiation of the escrow agreement.

          An escrow agreement is, and should remain, an insurance policy for the licensee, as long as it – in coordination with its legal counsel – has paved the way to a successful and well thought-out escrow rescue plan. This way, the user of the software will avoid all the pitfalls of poorly understood and drafted escrow agreements and source codes, for the present and future.



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