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How to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit?

As explained in our two previous articles relating to Brexit, ‟How to protect your creative business after Brexit?” and ‟Brexit legal implications: the road less travelled”, the European Union (‟EU”) regulations and conventions on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, ceased to apply in the United Kingdom (‟UK”) once it no longer was a EU member-state. Therefore, since 1 January 2021 (the ‟Transition date”), no clear legal system is in place, to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit, in a EU member-state, or in the UK. Creative businesses now have to rely on domestic recognition regimes in the UK and each EU member-state, if in existence. This introduces additional procedural steps before a foreign judgment is recognised, which makes the enforcement of EU civil and commercial judgments in the UK, and of UK civil and commercial judgments in the EU, more time-consuming, complex and expensive.

How to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit1. How things worked before Brexit, with respect to the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between the EU and the UK

a. The EU legal framework

Before the Transition date on which the UK ceased to be a EU member-state, there were, and there still are between the 27 remaining EU member-states, four main regimes that are applicable to civil and commercial judgments obtained from EU member-states, depending on when, and where, the relevant proceedings were started.

Each regime applies to civil and commercial matters, and therefore excludes matters relating to revenue, customs and administrative law. There are also separate EU regimes applicable to matrimonial relationships, wills, successions, bankruptcy and social security.

The most recent enforcement regime applicable to civil and commercial judgments is EU regulation n. 1215/2012 of the European parliament and of the council dated 12 December 2012 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Recast Brussels regulation). It applies to EU member-states’ judgments handed down in proceedings started on or after 10 January 2015.

The original Council regulation n. 44/2001 dated 22 December 2000 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Original Brussels regulation”), although no longer in force upon the implementation of the Recast Brussels regulation on 9 January 2015, still applies to EU member-states’ judgments handed down in proceedings started before 10 January 2015.

Moreover, the Brussels convention dated 27 September 1968 on the jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Brussels convention”), also continues to apply in relation to civil and commercial judgments between the 15 pre-2004 EU member-states and certain territories of EU member-states which are located outside the EU, such as Aruba, Caribbean Netherlands, Curacao, the French overseas territories and Mayotte. Before the Transition date, the Brussels convention also applied to judgments handed down in Gibraltar, a British overseas territory.

Finally, the Lugano convention dated 16 September 1988 on the jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟Lugano convention”), which was replaced on 21 December 2007 by the Lugano convention dated 30 October 2007 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the ‟2007 Lugano convention”), govern the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between the EU and certain member-states of the European Free Trade Association (‟EFTA”), namely Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark but not Liechtenstein, which never signed the Lugano convention.

The 2007 Lugano convention was intended to replace both the Lugano convention and the Brussels convention. As such it was open to signature to both EFTA members-states and to EU member-states on behalf of their extra-EU territories. While the former purpose was achieved in 2010 with the ratification of the 2007 Lugano convention by all EFTA member-states (except Liechtenstein, as explained above), no EU member-state has yet acceded to the 2007 Lugano convention on behalf of its extra-EU territories.

The UK has applied to join the 2007 Lugano convention after the Transition date, as we will explain in more details in section 2 below.

b. Enforceability of remedies ordered by a EU court

Before Brexit, the Recast Brussels regulation, the Original Brussels regulation, the Brussels convention, the Lugano convention and the 2007 Lugano convention (together, the ‟EU instruments”) provided, and still provide with respect to the 27 remaining EU member-states, for the enforcement of any judgment in a civil or commercial matter given by a court of tribunal of a EU member-state, whatever it is called by the original court. For example, article 2(a) of the Recast Brussels regulation provides for the enforcement of any ‟decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as a decision on the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court”.

The Original Brussels regulation also extends to interim, provisional or protective relief (including injunctions), when ordered by a court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this regulation.

c. Competent courts

Before the Transition date, proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement of EU foreign judgments in the UK should be brought before the high court in England and Wales, the court of session in Scotland and the high court of Northern Ireland.

Article 32 of the Brussels convention provides that the proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement of EU foreign judgments in France should be brought before the president of the ‟tribunal judiciaire”. Therefore, before the Transition date, a UK judgment had to be brought before such president, in order to be recognised and enforced in France.

d. Separation of recognition and enforcement

Before the Transition date, and for judgments that fell within the EU instruments other than the Recast Brussels regulation, the process for obtaining recognition of a EU judgment was set out in detail in Part 74 of the UK civil procedure rules (‟CPR”). The process involved applying to a high court master with the support of written evidence. The application should include, among other things, a verified or certified copy of the EU judgment and a certified translation (if necessary). The judgment debtor then had an opportunity to oppose appeal registration on certain limited grounds. Assuming the judgment debtor did not successfully oppose appeal registration, the judgment creditor could then take steps to enforce the judgment.

Before the Transition date, and for judgments that fell within the Recast Brussels regulation, the position was different. Under article 36 of the Recast Brussels regulation, judgments from EU member-states are automatically recognised as if they were a judgment of a court in the state in which the judgment is being enforced; no special procedure is required for the judgment to be recognised. Therefore, prior to Brexit, all EU judgments that fell within the Recast Brussels regulation were automatically recognised as if they were UK judgments, by the high court in England and Wales, the court of session in Scotland and the high court of Northern Ireland. Similarly, all UK judgments that fell within the Recast Brussels regulation were automatically recognised as if they were French judgments, by the presidents of the French ‟tribunal judiciaires”.

Under the EU instruments, any judgment handed down by a court or tribunal from a EU member-state can be recognised. There is no requirement that the judgment must be final and conclusive, and both monetary and non-monetary judgments are eligible to be recognised. Therefore, neither the UK courts, nor the French courts, are entitled to investigate the jurisdiction of the originating EU court. Such foreign judgments shall be recognised without any special procedures, subject to the grounds for non-recognition set out in article 45 of the Recast Brussels regulation, article 34 of the Original Brussels regulation and article 34 of the Lugano convention, as discussed in paragraph e. (Defences) below.

For the EU judgment to be enforced in the UK, prior to the Transition date, and pursuant to article 42 of the Recast Brussels regulation and Part 74.4A of the CPR, the applicant had to provide the documents set out in above-mentioned article 42 to the UK court, i.e.

  • a copy of the judgment which satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity;
  • the certificate issued pursuant to article 53 of the Recast Brussels regulation, certifying that the above-mentioned judgment is enforceable and containing an extract of the judgment as well as, where appropriate, relevant information on the recoverable costs of the proceedings and the calculation of interest, and
  • if required by the court, a translation of the certificate and judgment.

It was incumbent on the party resisting enforcement to apply for refusal of recognition of the EU judgment, pursuant to article 45 of the Recast Brussels regulation.

Similarly, for UK judgments to be enforced in France, prior to the Transition date, the applicant had to provide the documents set out in above-mentioned article 42 to the French court, which would trigger the automatic enforcement of the UK judgment, in compliance with the principle of direct enforcement.

e. Defences

While a UK defendant may have raised merits-based defences to liability or to the scope of the award entered in the EU jurisdiction, the EU instruments contain express prohibitions on the review of the merits of a judgment from another EU member-state. Consequently, while a judgment debtor may have objected to the registration of a judgment under the EU instruments (or, in the case of the Recast Brussels regulation, which does not require such registration, appeal the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment), he or she could have done so only on strictly limited grounds.

In the case of the Recast Brussels regulation, there are set out in above-mentioned article 45 and include:

  • if recognition of the judgment would be manifestly contrary to public policy;
  • if the judgment debtor was not served with proceedings in time to enable the preparation of a proper defence, or
  • if conflicting judgments exist in the UK or other EU member-states.

Equivalent defences are set out in articles 34 to 35 of the Original Brussels regulation and the 2007 Lugano convention, respectively. The court may not have refused a declaration of enforceability on any other grounds.

Another ground for challenging the recognition and enforcement of EU judgments is the breach of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‟ECHR”), which is the right to a fair trial. However, since a fundamental objective underlying the EU regime is to facilitate the free movement of judgments by providing a simple and rapid procedure, and since it was established in Maronier v Larmer [2003] QB 620 that this objective would be frustrated if EU courts of an enforcing EU member-state could be required to carry out a detailed review of whether the procedures that resulted in the judgment had complied with article 6 of the ECHR, there is a strong presumption that the EU court procedures of other signatories of the ECHR are compliant with article 6. Nonetheless, the presumption can be rebutted, in which case it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the judgment.

To conclude, pre-Brexit, the EU regime (and, predominantly, the Recast Brussels regulation) was an integral part of the system of recognition and enforcement of judgments in the UK. However, after the Transition date, the UK left the EU regime as found in the Recast Brussels regulation, the Original Brussels regulation and the Brussels convention, since these instruments are only available to EU member-states.

So what happens now?

2. How things work after Brexit, with respect to the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between the EU and the UK

In an attempt to prepare the inevitable, the EU commission published on 27 August 2020 a revised notice setting out its views on how various conflicts of laws issues will be determined post-Brexit, including jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments (the ‟EU notice”), while the UK ministry of justice published on 30 September 2020 Cross-border civil and commercial legal cases: guidance for legal professionals from 1 January 2021” (the ‟MoJ guidance”).

a. The UK accessing the 2007 Lugano convention

As mentioned above, the UK applied to join the 2007 Lugano convention on 8 April 2020, as this is the UK’s preferred regime for governing questions of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments with the 27 remaining EU member-states, after the Transition date.

However, accessing the 2007 Lugano convention is a four-step process and the UK has not executed those four stages in full yet.

While step one was accomplished on 8 April 2020 when the UK applied to join, step two requires the EU (along with the other contracting parties, ie the EFTA member-states Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark) to approve the UK’s application to join, followed in step three by the UK depositing the instrument of accession. Step four is a three-month period, during which the EU (or any other contracting state) may object, in which case the 2007 Lugano convention will not enter into force between the UK and that party. Only after that three-month period has expired, does the 2007 Lugano convention enter into force in the UK.

Therefore, in order for the 2007 Lugano convention to have entered into force by the Transition date, the UK had to have received the EU’s approval and deposited its instrument of accession by 1 October 2020. Neither have occured.

Since the EU’s negotiating position, throughout Brexit, has always been ‟nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, and in light of the recent collision course between the EU and the UK relating to trade in Northern Ireland, it is unlikely that the UK’s request to join the 2007 Lugano convention will be approved by the EU any time soon.

b. The UK accessing the Hague convention

Without the 2007 Lugano convention, the default position after the Transition date is that jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments for new cases issued in the UK will be determined by the domestic law of each UK jurisdiction (i.e. the common law of England and Wales, the common law of Scotland and the common law of Northern Ireland), supplemented by the Hague convention dated 30 June 2005 on choice of court agreements (‟The Hague convention”).

I. At common law rules

The common law relating to recognition and enforcement of judgments applies where the jurisdiction from which the judgment relates does not have an applicable treaty in place with the UK, or in the absence of any applicable UK statute. Prominent examples include judgments of the courts of the United States, China, Russia and Brazil. And now of the EU and its 27 remaining EU member-states.

At common law, a foreign judgment is not directly enforceable in the UK, but instead will be treated as if it creates a contract debt between the parties. The foreign judgment must be final and conclusive, as well as for a specific monetary sum, and on the merits of the action. The creditor will then need to bring an action in the relevant UK jurisdiction for a simple debt, to obtain judicial recognition in accordance with Part 7 CPR, and an English judgment.

Once the judgment creditor has obtained an English judgment in respect of the foreign judgment, that English judgment will be enforceable in the same way as any other judgment of a court in England.

However, courts in the UK will not give judgment on such a debt, where the original court lacked jurisdiction according to the relevant UK conflict of law rules, if it was obtained by fraud, or is contrary to public policy or the requirements of natural justice.

With such blurry and vague contours to the UK common law rules, no wonder that many lawyers and legal academics, on both sides of the Channel, decry the ‟mess” and ‟legal void” left by Brexit, as far as the enforcement and recognition of civil and commercial judgments in the UK are concerned.

II. The Hague convention

As mentioned above, from the Transition date onwards, the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments for new cases issued in England and Wales will be determined by its common law, supplemented by the Hague convention.

The Hague convention gives effect to exclusive choice of court clauses, and provides for judgments given by courts that are designated by such clauses to be recognised and enforced in other contracting states. The contracting states include the EU, Singapore, Mexico and Montenegro. The USA, China and Ukraine have signed the Hague convention but not ratified or acceded to it, and it therefore does not currently apply in those countries.

Prior to the Transition date, the UK was a contracting party to the Hague convention because it continued to benefit from the EU’s status as a contracting party. The EU acceded on 1 October 2015. By re-depositing the instrument of accession on 28 September 2020, the UK acceded in its own right to the Hague convention on 1 January 2021, thereby ensuring that the Hague convention would continue to apply seamlessly from 1 January 2021.

As far as types of enforceable orders are concerned, under the Hague convention, the convention applies to final decisions on the merits, but not interim, provisional or protective relief (article 7). Under article 8(3) of the Hague convention, if a foreign judgment is enforceable in the country of origin, it may be enforced in England. However, article 8(3) of the Hague convention allows an English court to postpone or refuse recognition if the foreign judgment is subject to appeal in the country of origin.

However, there are two major contentious issues with regards to the material and temporal scope of the Hague convention, and the EU’s and UK’s positions differ on those issues. They are likely to provoke litigation in the near future.

The first area of contention relates to the material scope of the Hague convention: more specifically, what is an ‟exclusive choice of court agreement”?

Article 1 of the Hague convention provides that the convention only applies to exclusive choice of courts agreements, so the issue of whether a choice of court agreement is ‟exclusive” or not is critical as to whether such convention applies.

Exclusive choice of court agreements are defined in article 3(a) of the Hague convention as those that designate ‟for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting state or one or more specific courts of one Contracting state, to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts”.

Non-exclusive choice of court agreements are defined in article 22(1) of the The Hague convention as choice of court agreements which designate ‟a court or courts of one or more Contracting states”.

Although this is a fairly clear distinction for ‟simple” choice of court agreements, ‟asymmetric” or ‟unilateral” agreements are not so easily categorised. These types of jurisdiction agreements are a common feature of English law-governed finance documents, such as the Loan Market Association standard forms. They generally give one contracting party (the lender) the choice of a range of courts in which to sue, while limiting the other party (the borrower) to the courts of a single state (usually, the lender’s home state).

There are divergent views as to whether asymmetric choice of court agreements are exclusive or non-exclusive for the purposes of the Hague convention. While two English high court judges have expressed the view that choice of court agreements should be regarded as exclusive, within the scope of the Hague convention, the explanatory report accompanying the Hague convention, case law in EU member-states and academic commentary all suggest the opposite.

This issue will probably be resolved in court, if and when the time comes to decide whether asymmetric or unilateral agreements are deemed to be exclusive choice of court agreements, susceptible to fall within the remit of the Hague convention.

The second area of contention relates to the temporal scope of the Hague convention: more specifically, when did the Hague convention ‟enter into force” in the UK?

Pursuant to article 16 of the Hague convention, such convention only applies to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded ‟after its entry into force, for the State of the chosen court”.

There is a difference of opinion as to the application of the Hague convention to exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of UK courts entered into between 1 October 2015 and 1 January 2021, when the UK was a party to the Hague convention by virtue of its EU membership.

Indeed, while the EU notice states that the Hague convention will only apply between the EU and UK to exclusive choice of court agreements ‟concluded after the convention enters into force in the UK as a party in its own right to the convention” – i.e. from the Transition date; the MoJ guidance sets out that the Hague convention ‟will continue to apply to the UK (without interruption) from its original entry into force date of 1 October 2015”, which is when the EU became a signatory to the convention, at which time the convention also entered into force in the UK by virtue of the UK being a EU member-state.

 

To conclude, the new regime of enforcement and recognition of EU judgments in the UK, and vice versa, is uncertain and fraught with possible litigation with respect to the scope of application of the Hague convention, at best.

Therefore, and since these legal issues relating to how to enforce civil and commercial judgments after Brexit are here to stay for the medium term, it is high time for the creative industries to ensure that any dispute arising out of their new contractual agreements are resolved through arbitration.

Indeed, as explained in our article ‟Alternative dispute resolution in the creative industries, arbitral awards are recognised and enforced by the Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 1958 (the ‟New York convention”). Such convention is unaffected by Brexit and London, the UK capital, is one of the most popular and trusted arbitral seats in the world.

Until the dust settles, with respect to the recognition and enforcement of EU judgments in the UK, and vice versa, it is wise to resolve any civil or commercial dispute by way of arbitration, to obtain swift, time-effective and cost-effective resolution of matters, while preserving the cross-border relationships, established with your trade partners, between the UK and the European continent.



 

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    Why the UK TuneIn judgments are a return to the dark ages

    What happens when you let some old farts from the UK judiciary, fueled by a doomed Brexit, single-handedly decide the technological future, advances and boon to which UK users should have access to? Well, stupid business choices justified by perfectly elegant and intellectually stimulating legal decisions handed down by old timers on a rampage to make ‟Britain great again”. I am sorry that TuneIn had to pay such a hefty price, on the UK market but, oh boy, it did.

    TuneInAs a daily jogger, I am an early adopter, and fervent user, of radio apps, such as Radio Garden and TuneIn, in order to listen to, in particular, Los Angeles’ radio stations such as KCRW Eclectic 24 and KPFK, while I am practising my daily and morning sport exercises. While at home, I listen to French radio stations such as FIP or Nova, or to LA channels, via Tunein which is accessible on my Sonos home sound systems, software (installed on my two iphones) and speakers.

    However, over the last year or so, I could not help but notice that European radio stations, such as FIP or France Inter, were no longer accessible from either TuneIn station or Sonos Radio station, while I am in the United Kingdom (‟UK”).

    Well, now I know why. Indeed, I read today the 3 latest issues from Music Confidential published by Susan Butler on the ‟TuneIn appellate decision” (sic).

    Intrigued, I decided to delve deeper into this case and gulped (there is no other word) the 47 pages of the Warner Music UK Ltd and Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd versus TuneIn Inc decision handed down by the High court of justice of England & Wales on 1 November 2019, as well as the 56 pages of the TuneIn Inc versus Warner Music UK Limited and Sony Music Entertainment UK Limited judgment handed down by the Court of appeal on 26 March 2021.

    Whilst I admire the intellectual virtuosity of the first degree judge, Justice Birss, displayed in the above-mentioned first degree decision, as well as the ‟strong hand in a velvet glove” approach favoured by the appeal judge, Justice Arnold, in the appellate judgment, I can only conclude that this exercise in intellectual masturbation by the judiciary has led, yet again, to another castration of a technological product full of creativity, advancement, connectivity to the world and fantastic ubiquity.

    Am I therefore pissed off?

    Yes. Here is why.

    Are you actually saying that TuneIn should ditch internet radio stations which are unlicensed in the UK?

    The ‟modus operandi” of TuneIn is to operate an online platform, website and apps, which provide a service enabling users to access radio stations around the world. The service is called TuneIn Radio.

    It is now available on over 200 platform connected devices, including smart phones, tablets, televisions, car audio systems, smart speakers such as Sonos, and wearable technologies.

    TuneIn Radio has links to over 100,000 radio stations, broadcast by third parties from many different geographic locations around the world. It is monetised through advertising and subscriptions, although the subscription is free for many users of hardware products such as Sonos and Bose sound systems.

    TuneIn Radio is awesome because, like Radio Garden, it allows users to save some radio channels as favourites, offers some curation services as well as some search functions, which a new user may use when he or she does not know what radio stations he or she may like. In addition, TuneIn Radio provides perks such as personalisation of content, collation of station information presented on individual station pages, and artist information set out on dedicated artist pages.

    Even better, until a few years ago, TuneIn Radio offered a recording device, through its Pro app, which also included a curated repertoire of a large number of music internet radio stations.

    As a user, you are therefore blissfully entertained, and your every musical needs catered for, when using the full gamut of TuneIn Radio’s perks and services.

    Well, such users’ bliss was short-lived, however, since the High court decision, confirmed by the 2021 appellate judgment, found that by including internet radio stations which are either unlicensed, such as Capital FM Bangladesh and Urban 96.5 Nigeria, or not compliant with the local neighbouring rights regime, such as Kazakhstan station Gakku FM and Montenegro’s City Radio, TuneIn Radio was infringing under section 20 of the 1988 Copyright, designs and patents act (the ‟Act”) which provides:

    20. Infringement by communication to the public
    (1) The communication to the public of the work is an act restricted by the copyright in—
    (a) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work,
    (b) a sound recording or film, or
    (c) a broadcast.

    (2) References in this Part to communication to the public are to communication to the public by electronic transmission, and in relation to a work include—
    (a) the broadcasting of the work;
    (b) the making available to the public of the work by electronic transmission in such a way that members of the public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.

    So not only those unlicensed and non-compliant internet radio stations are in breach of the right to communicate to the public, but TuneIn Radio is too, since it provides links to those streams.

    Had TuneIn Radio not obtained a warranty from those internet radio stations that they operated lawfully in their home state? God forbid, TuneIn Radio could not rely on such warranty, of course, and the onus was on TuneIn Radio to double-check that such internet radio stations were either licensed or compliant with their local neighbouring rights regime.

    So what is the direct consequence of such stance, taken by the UK High court and Court of appeal? Well, all those internet radio stations become unavailable to the public, in the UK but also probably in other European countries such as the 27 member-states of the European Union (‟EU”), via the TuneIn Radio platforms, websites and apps.

    Indeed, all the reasoning made by Justice Birss, in the first degree case, as well as Justice Arnold, in the appellate case, revolved around article 3 of the EU Information Society Directive (the ‟Directive”), which was transposed into the above-mentioned section 20 of the Act, and the abondant, eye-wateringly complex and excruciatingly intricate related case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‟CJEU”) on the right of communication to the public.

    So, yeah, you bet, this TuneIn case is valid both for the UK (which has now exited the EU via its unwitty Brexit), and the 27 remaining member-states of the EU.

    Therefore, users and customers lose because they cannot listen to all worldwide internet radio streams via TuneIn anymore, as a direct consequence of the UK decisions.

    And it does not stop there! Perish the thought.

    What about those music radio stations which are licensed for a local territory other than the UK, such as VRT Studio Brussel in Belgium, Mix Megapol in Sweden and MavRadio in the USA?

    For these radio stations outside the USA, the countries operate various kinds of remuneration rights regimes and these stations are paying remuneration under these local schemes. The USA operates a statutory licence scheme conditional on paying royalties and the sample radio MavRadio pays those royalties. However, in all of these cases, the relevant body has not granted geographical rights for the UK.

    Ahhh, the UK first degree judgement, confirmed in appeal says, that’s not my problem, my dear sir: TuneIn’s act of communication in relation to those sample radio streams which pay royalties to a body that does not grant geographical rights for the UK, is unlawful, unless licensed by the UK rights holder. Since it is currently not, TuneIn’s actions amount to infringement under above-mentioned section 20 of the Act.

    Therefore, TuneIn has to now remove all this pool of internet radio stations from its platforms, apps and websites too, until it has figured out how to strike a deal with the UK rights holders.

    Probably, TuneIn’s best call is to reach out to the UK neighbouring rights collecting society, PPL, and start the licensing negotiations from there, immediately. Also, TuneIn better cooperate directly with labels Warner and Sony, to strike those licences, now that the UK first degree decision has been confirmed in appeal and since these two claimants ‟account for more than half the market for digital sales of recorded music in the UK and about 43 percent globally” (sic).

    While I can understand that the UK courts would slam TuneIn for not proactively getting a UK neighbouring rights’ licence for its own premium radio stations, made available exclusively to TuneIn’s subscribers, I found it profoundly castrating to make TuneIn’s liable for primary infringement of the right of communication to the public for merely providing streams to unlicensed and non-compliant third party internet radio stations and to third party internet radio stations which do not pay royalties in the UK.

    What about the right of UK and EU users to have access to as much culture, musical experience and knowhow, as possible, even in a geopolitical context where most countries in the world do not care about, and probably don’t even know what are, neighbouring rights?

    This is directly discriminating UK and, probably, all EU listeners and users, because TuneIn will now have to geoblock all its links to non-compliant and unruly streams, which probably constitute at least 50 percent of the 100,000 internet radio stations available on its apps, platforms and websites.

    So Justice Birss and Justice Arnold can now breathe a sigh of relief, at the thought of having saved European neighbouring rights in the face or barbarian non-British cultural invasion, but I am sure that most UK users of TuneIn only have a ‟fuck you” to respond in return, for their ill-advised, technologically-stiffling and Brexitist stance on the matter.

    Now, by using TuneIn Radio, a UK user will only have access to music radio stations which are licensed in the UK by PPL, such as BBC Radio 2, Heart London, Classic FM and Jazz FM. Thank you very much, but we can already access those radio channels on our terrestrial radio sets or on their respective online platforms, from the UK, so what is the added value of TuneIn Radio in the UK now, pray tell?

    So I can’t use the recording service on TuneIn anymore?

    Of course, Justice Birss, and then Justice Arnold, went for the jugular with respect to the recording option by users of TuneIn’s Pro app.

    Indeed, in terms of a user’s use of the recording function, the claimants contended that the Pro app was not just a recording device. It also included a curated repertoire of a large number of music internet radio stations. The purchaser of the Pro app would, reasonably, understand that TuneIne had sold them the Pro app (with its built in recording function) in order to allow them to record audio content offered by the TuneIn Radio service. There was also a point on the degree of control exercised by TuneIn. Only internet radio stations provided by TuneIn could be recorded and TuneIn could disable the record function at a station-by-station level.

    While this TuneIn recording function was a very original, and unique, offered feature, in the competitive world of radio aggregators, the High court decision, confirmed in appeal, swiftly killed it, by finding that ‟TuneIn had authorised the infringements carried out by its users by recording using the Pro app” and therefore ‟TuneIn’s service via the Pro app when the recording function was enabled infringed the claimants’ copyrights under Section 20 of the Act”.

    Even if Justice Arnold allowed the appeal, in his appellant judgment, against the conclusion drawn by the first degree judge, that TuneIn was liable for infringement by communication to the public in relation to the ‟category 1” stations (i.e. the internet radio stations which already are licensed in the UK via PPL) by virtue of providing the Pro app to UK users with the record function enabled, the outcome is the same: off with its head, with respect to the great recording function offered by TuneIn’s Pro app.

    As Susan Butler wisely wrote, in her Music Confidential’s last three issues, ‟in my view, however, that does not mean that (intellectual property) must be disruptive to digital innovation across national borders”. ‟(…) the bad kind of disruption – the costly and destructive kind – seems to occur most often when anyone tries to drag old business models or entities built around old business models into new multi-national digital marketplace. (…) Everyone must become more pliable to truly reshape the market to support true innovation”.

    Well, Susan, with the old farts who handed down the 2019 and then 2021 decisions (check them out on the audio-video recorded hearings here!), count on it.

    Another example of UK splendid and backward looking isolation, my friends: where is my visa to move to Los Angeles asap, please?



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      How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?

      In the creative industries, many intellectual property rights, such as copyright, trademarks, registered designs and patents, are subjected to licenses, in order for right owners and creators to monetize such rights. However, things do not always go smoothly during and after the term of the licensing agreement, between the licensor and the licensee. Therefore, what are the remedies that the licensor may put in place, in order to ensure that his or her intellectual property rights are fairly monetised? How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?

      How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?1. What is a license agreement?

      A license is the contract which authorises the use of a certain intellectual property right (‟IPRs”), be it copyright, a trademark, a design or a patent, for commercial purposes, by a licensee, in exchange for the payment of royalties to the licensor, i.e. the right owner. These royalties are usually computed as a percentage of the turnover generated by the sale of products manufactured, or services provided, by the licensee under this license agreement.

      A license is different from an assignment agreement, in that the former has a limited term, whereby the authorisation to use the IPRs granted to the licensee by the licensor will expire, after a period of time explicitly set out in the license agreement. On the contrary, an assignment is a perpetual and irreversible transfer of ownership of some designated IPRs, from the assignor to the assignee, in exchange for the payment of a consideration (usually, a one-off sum of money).

      To resume, a license is temporary and reversible upon expiry of a term, while an assignment is irrevocable and irreversible if made for consideration.

      2. How are licenses used in the creative industries?

      Licenses are often used in the creative industries, in order for creatives to monetise the IPRs that they created.

      For example, in the music industry, many copyright licenses are entered into, in order for music distributors to distribute the masters of sound recordings to new territories, which are difficult to reach for the music label which owns such masters because this label is located in a totally different geographical area. Therefore, the licensor, the music label, relies on the expertise of the local licensee, the national distributor, to put in place the best local strategy to broadcast the masters of its sound recordings, via radio plays, local streaming websites, TV broadcasting, and then to generate revenues through these various income streams and local neighbouring rights collecting societies.

      Another example of a copyright license, in the fashion and luxury sectors, is when a brand commissions an artist or designer to make some drawings and designs, which the brand will then display on its website(s), as well as in its various stores. These drawings and designs being protected by copyright, the brand, as licensee, will enter into a license agreement with the artist, as licensor, to obtain the right to use these drawings and designs in set locations and premises of this brand.

      Licenses are also extremely widely used in the context of trademarks, especially with respect to distribution of luxury and fashion products on new geographical territories by local distributors (who need to have the right to use the trademark to advertise, market and open retail locations), and also with respect to deals where the licensee manufactures products in which it has a lot of expertise (such as perfumes, cosmetics, children’s garments), which the licensee then sells under the trademark of a famous fashion or luxury brand, i.e. the licensor.

      In the technology sector, patent and/or copyright licenses are the norm. Indeed, softwares and sources codes are protected by copyright, so many tech companies make a living licensing their copyright into such inventions, to their retail or business customers, in exchange for some royalties and/or licensing fees. As far as technological products are concerned, those can be protected by patents, provided that they are novel, that an inventive step was present in creating such products, and that the invention is capable of industrial application. Therefore, most technological hardware products, such as mobile phones, computers, tablets, are protected by patents. And whenever there is a dichotomy between the creator of these products, and the manufacturers and distributors of such products, then some patent license agreements are entered into.

      Technology licenses are, indeed, so critical, that fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (‟FRAND”) have been set up in order to level the playing field: FRAND terms denote a voluntary licensing commitment that standards organisations often request from the owner of an IPR (usually a patent) which is, or may become, essential to practice a technical standard. One of the most common policies, is for the standard- setting organisation to require from a patent holder that it voluntarily agrees to include its patented technology in the standard, by licensing that technology on FRAND terms. Failing or refusing to license IPRs on FRAND terms could even be deemed to infringe antitrust rules, in particular those of the European Union (‟EU”). For example, the EU commission sent a statement of objections to Motorola Mobility, for breach of EU antitrust rules, over its attempt to enforce a patent infringement injunction against Apple in Germany. The patents in question relate to GPRS, a part of the GSM standard, which is used to make mobile phone calls. Motorola accepted that these patents were standard essential patents and had, therefore, agreed that they would be licensed to Apple on FRAND terms. However, in 2011, Motorola tried to take out, and enforce, a patent infringement injunction against Apple in Germany, based on those patents, even although Apple had said that it was willing to pay royalties, to use the patented technology. Samsung was also the recipient of a statement of objections from the EU commission, after it sought patent infringement injunctions to ‟prevent Apple from infringing patents”, despite Apple apparently being willing to pay a license fee and negotiate a license on FRAND terms.

      3. How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran: what to do if the license has expired but your licensee keeps on using your IPRs?

      Due to poor management and in-house record-keeping, as well as human resources disorganisation and high turnover rate of staff, the licensee may breach the licensing agreement by keeping on using the licensed IPR, although the license agreement has reached its term.

      For example, in the above-mentioned case of the copyright license on some masters of sound recordings, the French local distributors and licensees of such masters overran the term of the license and kept on collecting royalties and revenues on those masters, in particular from French neighbouring rights collecting societies, well after the date of termination of this license. How, on earth, could have this happened? Well, as I experienced first hand at the music trade show Midem, many music distributors, labels and catalogues’ owners, such as music publishers, often mingle together in order to buy and sell to each other music catalogues, be it of copyrighted musical compositions and lyrics, or of copyrighted masters of sound recordings. Therefore, the terms of the first license agreement, between the licensor and the initial first licensee, become more and more blurry and forgotten, with basic provisions, such as the duration of the initial license, being conveniently lost into oblivion by the generation of successive licensees. Yes, I guarantee you, it happens very often.

      Another example, relating to the above-mentioned case of a copyright license granted by an artist, on his drawings and designs commissioned by a luxury brand, which used these drawings on its website(s) and stores, in order to promote its luxury products … even after the termination date of the license!

      So what can a licensor do, when he or she notices that the licensee has, or is, breaching the terms of the license agreement by overrunning its duration? How to remedy a breach of license which term is overran?

      First and foremost, the licensor must gather as much pieces of evidence as possible of such breach of the term of the license agreement, by the licensee. For example, the music label, licensor, may reach out to French neighbouring rights collecting societies and ask for the royalties statements for the French distributor, ex-licensee, up-to-date, in order to have some indisputable evidence that this ex-licensee kept on collecting the neighbouring rights royalties on the sound recordings which were the subject of the license, even after the termination date of this license. The French artist, whose designs and drawings kept on being used by the luxury brand after the term of his license with this brand expired, instructed our law firm to liaise with a French bailiff, in order to have this bailiff execute a detailed report of copyright infringement on internet, by taking snapshots of the webpages of this brand’s website displaying his drawings and designs.

      These pieces of evidence are indispensable, in order to prove the IPR infringement (since the license expired), to show it to the ex-licensee, if necessary, and to use it in any future lawsuit for IPR infringement lodged with a local court, if and when the ex-licensee refuses to settle further to receiving the ex-licensor’s letter before court action.

      You will have guessed by now that, indeed, once the ex-licensor has gathered as much conclusive evidence as possible that his or her IPR is being infringed by the ex-licensee because the latter keeps on using such IPR outside the contractual framework of the now-expired license agreement, the second stage is to instruct counsel, in the country where such IPR infringement is taking place, and have such counsel send a robust, cordial yet frank letter before court action to the ex-licensor, asking:

      • for the immediate cessation of any IPR infringement act, by stopping using the IPR at once;
      • for the evidence of, and information about, turnover and sales, relating to the sale of products and/or services, generated thanks to the use of the IPR beyond the term of the expired license, and
      • for the restitution of all those revenues generated by the sale of those products and/or services, generated thanks to the use of the IPR beyond the term of the expired license, as well as accrued late payment interests at the statutory interest rate,

      within a short deadline (usually, no longer than 14 days).

      Here, the ex-licensee has an option: either it decides to cave in and avoid a tarnished reputation by immediately complying with the terms of the ex-licensor’s letter before court action, or it may decide to act as a blowhard and ignore the requests set out in this letter. The first approach is favoured by anglo-saxon companies, while the second option is usual among French, and all other Mediterranean, ex-licensees.

      If the dispute may be resolved out-of-court, a settlement agreement will be drafted, negotiated and finalised, by the lawyers advising the ex-licensor and the ex-licensee, which will provide for the restitution of a very clearly defined sum of money, representing the sales generated by the ex-licensee during the period in which it overran the use of the litigious IPR.

      If the dispute cannot be resolved out-of-court, then the ex-licensor will have no other option left than to lodge a lawsuit for IPR infringement against the ex-licensee, which – provided the former has strong evidence of such breach of licensing agreement – it will won.

      Once the slate is clean again, i.e. after the ex-licensee has paid damages or restituted sums to the ex-licensor with respect to its use of the IPR after the termination date of the first license agreement, then ex-licensor and the ex-licensee may decide to resume doing business together. Here, I strongly advise that the parties draft a transparent, clear and straightforward new license agreement, which clearly sets out the termination date of this new future license, and foreseeable consequences in case the future licensee keeps on using the IPR beyond the end of such termination date. Using the services of either in-house lawyer or external counsel is very much advisable, in this instance, in order to avoid a repeat of the messy and damaging business situation which occured in the first place, between the licensor and the licensee.



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        Royalties collected on sound recording performance rights: how to distribute them in the right way

        On 8 September 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‟CJEU”) handed down a judgment which may have a groundbreaking effect on how European Union (‟EU”) collecting societies for music copyright, as well as EU music neighbouring rights collecting societies, distribute royalties collected on sound recording performance rights. This has stirred up controversy, with EU music performers, songwriters, composers, publishers and session musicians, crying foul, lamenting their future loss of income, as a direct consequence of this judgment. What happened exactly? Why are these EU music stakeholders up in arms? Is their reaction appropriate, in view of how royalties collected on sound recording performance rights are distributed, by non-EU collecting societies?

        Royalties collected on sound recording performance rights1. The CJEU judgment places ‟fairness” above the principle of reciprocity

        The dispute debated about, in the CJEU judgment dated 8 September 2020 (the ‟Judgment”), revolves around monies collected by the Irish neighbouring rights’ collecting society, Phonographic Performance Ireland (‟PPI”) and whether such monies are and, if not, should be, distributed back to all performers, including performers who are nationals in, or residents of, states located outside the EU (‟Third states”).

        Indeed, PPI’s practice is that performers who are residents of, or nationals in, Third states, and whose performances come from sound recordings carried out in Third states, are not entitled to receive a share of the fees that become payable when those performances are played in Ireland. According to PPI, this regime is perfectly compliant with the provisions set out in Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and the council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (‟Directive 2006/115”) and the international agreements to which Directive 2006/115 refers, such as the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations concluded in Rome on 26 October 1961 (the ‟Rome convention”) and the WIPO performances and phonograms treaty (‟WPPT”) signed in 1996.

        According to PPI, to pay those performers from Third states for the use in Ireland of phonograms to which they have contributed, would fail to have regard to the approach of international reciprocity legitimately adopted by Ireland. In particular, if PPI was to pay those performers a share of the above-mentioned fees, performers from the United States of America (‟USA”) would be paid in Ireland even though that Third state grants Irish performers the right to equitable remuneration only to a very limited extent.

        Here, I need to clarify this point about the USA not reciprocating in paying Irish (and all other EU residents and nationals) performers a share of the fees that become payable when the performances of these EU performers are played in the USA. As explained at length in my article on ‟Neighbouring rights in the digital era: how the music industry can cash in”, while the USA is the main market for neighbouring rights, the collection of such rights is limited to the public performance of sound recordings on digital medium only (such as online radio like Pandora, satellite broadcasting like Sirius/XM and online streaming of terrestrial radio transmission like iHeartRadio). Unlike most of the world, the USA does not apply sound recordings performance rights to broadcast radio, terrestrial radio and performance of sound recordings in bars, restaurants or other public places. Therefore, the pool on which royalties of sound recording performance rights are collected is much smaller, in the USA, than the pool on which royalties of sound recording performance rights are collected, in the EU.

        In the Judgment, the High Court of Ireland, which had decided to stay the proceedings between the parties in order to ask for a referral to the CJEU, asked the latter to answer four questions. Only the fourth question is relevant to the topic of this article, as follows:

        Is it permissible in any circumstances to confine the right to equitable remuneration to the producers of a sound recording, i.e. to deny the right to the performers whose performances have been fixed in that sound recording?”.

        This wording is fuzzy at best, so here is the key legal question asked by the Irish High Court, in plain English: is it compliant with the provisions of Directive 2006/115, the Rome convention and the WPPT for a EU neighbouring rights collecting society to refrain from paying any share of the fees that became payable, when performances coming from sound recordings carried out in Third states, by performers who are residents or nationals of Thirds states, are played in the EU?

        The short answer, set out with much flourish in the Judgment, is no. It’s not because US neighbouring rights collecting societies cannot pay a share of the fees on performances coming from sound recordings carried out in the EU, by performers who are residents or nationals of the EU, from sources such as broadcast radio, terrestrial radio, bars, restaurants and other US public places, that the EU collecting societies can retaliate by withholding all royalties that THEY collect on EU performances coming from sound recordings carried out in the USA, by performers who are residents or nationals of the USA. According to the CJEU, there is no justification to do that, in any provisions set out in the Directive 2006/115 and/or the Rome convention and WPPT. The principle of equitable remuneration must prevail, for all performers involved, wherever they come from, in the world.

        2. Why do EU performers and collecting societies lost their cool, when made aware of the Judgment?

        Across Continental Europe and Latin America, there is a long-established practice for collecting management societies (i.e. music copyright collecting societies and neighbouring rights societies) (‟CMOs”) to deduct amounts, from the monies they collect from the use of music, with an intention to spend those deducted sums on social and cultural purposes, such as aid.

        And where do these EU collecting societies derive the main of their income for ‟aid” and other ‟cultural” and ‟social” purposes from, mainly? Well, from the undistributed share of the fees on EU performances coming from sound recordings carried out in the USA, by performers who are residents or nationals of the USA, of course!

        So, for example, French performers’ neighbouring rights society ADAMI, expects that, as a direct consequence of the Judgment, its ‟aid” budgets are going to decrease by 35 percent, with annual ‟losses” valued between Euros12 million and Euros15 million, while French non-featured musicians and vocalists’ neighbouring rights society SPEDIDAM has publicly announced a decrease of 30 percent of its ‟aid” budgets, with a freeze on all allocated grants to boot. According to Irma, between Euros25 million to Euros30 million of ‟aids” and ‟grants” are directly threatened this year, in France.

        As set out in La Lettre du Musicien, ‟it is the whole ecosystem of the (EU) creation that has been struck, which is the last straw for a sector which already had to contend with an almost total alt to its activities (due to the lockdown caused by the COVID 19 pandemic)”.

        The bill could be even more difficult to foot, EU CMOs say, if the Judgment was deemed to have a retroactive effect, which may imply that payments in arrears could be in the region of Euros140 million.

        However, the Judgment is in line with the European Commission’s work to promote the EU’s digital economy, which is aligned with the Anglo-American approach to collecting music royalties (i.e. promoting the author’s creativity, through his/her copyright and neighbouring rights, for the benefit of the public, therefore, in more economic terms).

        Indeed, the Directive 2014/26/EU on collective rights management and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses (the ‟Directive 2014/26”) was adopted in order to reign in EU CMOs, and impose more rigour and transparency, as well as enhanced accountability and intra-EU competition, in a shambolic and deeply flawed EU-based CMOs landscape.

        As far as deductions for social, cultural or educational purposes are concerned, the Directive 2014/26 sets out that:

        • EU member-states must ensure that where a rightholder authorises an EU CMO to manage his/her rights (such as a songwriter, composer, performer, producer, label, publisher, session musician), this EU CMO is required to provide this rightholder with information on management fees and ‟other deductions”, from the rights revenue, before obtaining his/her consent to managing the rights, and
        • EU member-states must ensure that an EU CMO does not make deductions, other than for management fees, from the rights revenue generated by the rights it manages for other CMOs (‟derived from the rights it manages on the basis of representation agreements”), unless these other CMOs to these agreements ‟expressly consent to such deductions”.

        The problem is that, in pragmatic terms, many EU CMOs, in particular those from Continental Europe, fail to comply with national laws which transposed the Directive 2014/26, in this respect. Multiple EU CMOs completely ignore requests, made by either rightowners or other CMOs, to no longer deduct any amounts for social or cultural purposes, from the amounts due to the rightowners or other CMOs (the latter being a party to a representation agreement with the EU CMOs).

        Anyway, by 10 April 2021, the European Commission will have to release a report assessing how the provisions of the Directive 2014/26 have been applied by EU member-states and EU CMOs, which will then be submitted to the European Parliament and European Council. That report shall include an assessment of the impact of the Directive 2014/26 on the development of cross-border services and on the relations between CMOs and users and on the operation in the EU of CMOs established outside the EU, and, if necessary, on the need for a review. The European Commission’s report shall be accompanied, if appropriate, by a legislative proposal.

        Therefore, I bet that the European Commission will mention, in its upcoming 2021 report, the fact that EU legislation needs to be clarified, so that EU CMOs must pay performers from Third states, their share on EU performances coming from sound recordings carried out in Third states, by performers who are residents or nationals of the Third states, in compliance with the Judgment.

        3. What’s going to happen now, in the USA, knowing that EU CMOs must pay royalties collected on sound recording performance rights to US performers, from now on?

        Of course, the US recording industry had become increasingly vocal about the EU payment limitations debated in the Judgment in recent years, especially since neighbouring rights have become such a critical portion of music stakeholders’ total annual revenues.

        SoundExchange, the US organisation responsible for distributing royalties collected on sound recording performance rights, was leading the charge, arguing that it is unfair and an incorrect interpretation of global copyright and neighbouring rights treaties.

        Once the Judgment was handed down, SoundExchange exulted, releasing a statement praising ‟equal treatment” for creators, and setting out that the unfair treatment in question ‟denies US music creators an estimated USD330 million in direct global royalty payments a year”.

        Yes, well, ‟equal treatment” my foot! SoundExchange conveniently avoids dealing with the elephant in the room, which is that the USA must now immediately change its obsolete collecting management system, by widening the pool of sound recording performance collections to US monetary sources such as broadcast radio, terrestrial radio, bars, restaurants and other US public places.

        If the USA does not start reciprocating, by paying all sound recording performance royalties to EU performers, derived from all acceptable income sources, including broadcast radio, terrestrial radio, bars, restaurants and other US public places, I guarantee that a USA-EU cultural trade war is going to spring out, sharpish.

        EU CMOs must lobby hard and join forces, with US music stakeholders who have everything to win, in widening the pool of sound recording performance rights from which royalties are collected in the USA. US performers and artists will be of course on board, but they do not have much gravitas, all by themselves. SoundExchange seems like the best ally to EU CMOs, in this battle, but I am under the impression that SoundExchange does not want to rock the boat, what with US telecommunication behemoths and streaming and other tech companies to contend with, and a SoundExchange board of directors rife with top brass and lawyers on the payroll of these various US media and tech conglomerates.

         

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          Lawfully Creative | Joe DiMona, climate change activist and ex-BMI in-house lawyer

          About the show

          Joe DiMonaThe podcast ‟Lawfully Creative” is a series of intimate and honest conversations hosted by Annabelle Gauberti, the founding and managing partner of London and Paris-based law firm Crefovi, which focuses on advising the creative industries. Annabelle talks with artists, policy makers and professionals in the creative industries – to hear their stories, what inspires their creations, what decisions changed their careers, and what relationships influenced their work. Produced by Crefovi.

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          Catch-up with our original shows on iTunes, Spotify, DeezerStitcherYouTube, Patreon, Google PodcastsSoundcloud, CastboxTuneIn, Breaker, RadioPublic, Anchor, Pocket Casts, PlayerFM, iHeartRadio and Overcast, every month. 

          Episode n. 15: Joe DiMona, climate change activist and ex-BMI in-house lawyer

          Joe DiMonaJoe DiMona is a legal man, through and through. At BMI, he was a fervent ambassador for music creators, ensuring that they got their fair share through blanket licences, royalties collections and tense negotiations with telecommunications companies as well as streaming and other tech companies. Now, in his new role as a climate change activist, Joe enjoys drafting model environmental laws, which will be ready to enter into force when the next president of the USA finally decides to implement a proper environmentally friendly policy.

          28 September 2020 – Joe DiMona, son of the best-selling novelist of suspense novels, Joseph DiMona, chose a career in the music publishing business, as a BMI in-house lawyer. Further to working at this top US music copyright collecting society for 27 years, Joe recently shifted his focus to climate change activism and lobbying. Hear Joe’s war stories and snippets of his vast experience as a music lawyer, here, in his conversation with Crefovi’s founding and managing partner, Annabelle Gauberti.

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          A global network

          Clients praise Crefovi’s lawyers for their responsiveness & ability to understand the technical, business and legal aspects of each commercial transaction and come back, deal after deal, to be advised by them.

          While London and Paris based, we routinely work across borders. The vast majority of our engagements are multi-jurisdictional. We are used to working in multinational teams, and rely on our network of specialist lawyers for support in other jurisdictions.

          The team has therefore established an extensive international network of creative industries’ contacts and a close association with other specialist lawyers worldwide. Our history of successes in high profile, politically sensitive matters reflects an ability to act swiftly and with the utmost discretion.

          Indeed, Crefovi’s lawyers are very well connected in the world of the creative industries, attending, and participating to discussion panels at, on a regular basis, each session of the professional trade shows such as CESWeb SummitDLD & SlushMidem, as well as the Cannes film festival and EFM and the Berlinale.



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